U.S. Naval War College

U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons
CIWAG Case Studies
11-2012

Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps: The
Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq
Richard H. Shultz Jr

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-studies

Recommended Citation
Shultz, Richard H. Jr, "Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps: The Counterinsurgency Campaign in
Iraq" (2012). CIWAG Case Studies. 2.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-studies/2

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in CIWAG Case Studies by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval War College Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

AR
UL
G

WARFARE

an
d

CE

D GROU
ME
PS

AR

R on IR
NTE
RE

Draft as of 121916

U
N

IT
ED

OL
STA
TES NA AL WAR C
V

LE

GE

Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps:
The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq
Dr. Richard Shultz

United States Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island

Organizational Learning and the Marine
Corps: The Counterinsurgency Campaign
in Iraq
Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG)
US Naval War College, Newport, RI
CIWAG@usnwc.edu

Shultz: Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps

CIWAG Case Studies
Water Wars: The Brahmaputra River and Sino-Indian Relations—
Mark Christopher
Taliban Networks in Afghanistan—Antonio Giustozzi
Operationalizing Intelligence Dominance—Roy Godson
El Salvador in the 1980s: War by Other Means—Donald R. Hamilton
Operational Strategies to Counter IED Threat in Iraq—Michael
Iacobucci
Sovereign Wealth Funds as Tools of National Strategy: Singapore’s
Approach—Devadas Krishnadas
Varieties of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2003-2009—
Jon Lindsay and Roger Petersen
Piracy—Martin Murphy
An Operator’s Guide to Human Terrain Teams—Norman Nigh
Revolutionary Risks: Cyber Technology and Threats in the 2011
Libyan Revolution—John Scott-Railton
Organizational
Learning
and the
Marine
Corps:
Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq—Richard Shultz

The

Reading the Tea Leaves: Proto-Insurgency in Honduras—John D.
Waghelstein

2

Shultz: Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps

This work is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This case study is available on CIWAG’s public website located at
http://www.usnwc.edu/ciwag

3

Shultz: Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps

Message from the Editors
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on
Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary
mission is twofold: first, to bring cutting edge research on Irregular
Warfare into the Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME)
curricula; and second, to bring operators, practitioners, and scholars
together to share their knowledge and experiences about a vast array of
violent and non-violent irregular challenges. This case study is part of
an ongoing effort at CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by worldrenowned academics, case studies, research papers, articles and books.
Our aim is to make these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive
curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet the
challenges of the post-9/11 world.
Dr. Richard Shultz is the author of this case study, which
examines how the Marine Corps was able to learn from and adapt to
conditions on the ground in Anbar province from 2006–2008,
developing a three-dimensional strategy that resulted in stability from
previous chaos and overwhelming violence. The author views this
success through the lens of organizational theory, discussing the
barriers to change in military organizations and the characteristics of
organizations that are able to learn. The Marines’ focus on learning,
adaptability, and institutional memory are seen as keys to their success
in Anbar. Ten lessons are drawn from this case that relate to the future
irregular conflict environment and to the efficacy of counterinsurgency,
engagement, and counterterrorism as instruments for managing these
future challenges for both US military and civilian security institutions.
It is also important to note three critical caveats to this case
study. First, the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the
author and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense,
the Naval War College or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been
made to correct any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately
responsible for the content of this case study. Third, the study questions
presented in all CIWAG case studies are written to provoke discussion
on a wide variety of topics including strategic, operational, and tactical
4
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matters as well as ethical and moral questions confronted by operators
in the battlefield. The point is to make these case studies part of an
evolving and adaptive curriculum that fulfills the needs of students
preparing to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world and to show
them the dilemmas that real people faced in high-pressure situations.
Finally, in addition to a range of teaching questions that are
intended to serve as the foundation for classroom discussion, students
conducting research on Iraq and Anbar Province will probably find the
extensive bibliography at the end of the case helpful. Compiled by the
case study author, the bibliography is a selection of the best books and
articles on a range of related topics. We hope you find it useful and
look forward to hearing your feedback on the cases and suggestions for
how you can contribute to the Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed
Group’s mission here at the Naval War College.
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I. Introduction
A SITREP—situation report—for Anbar province as 2006
devolved from the spring into the summer months would have had the
following bleak bottom line: surging violence and grim prognoses.
That was the overwhelming conventional wisdom. Enemy violence was
skyrocketing, while almost every prediction for any U.S. success in
Anbar was plummeting.
This was even true for the chief of Marine intelligence in
Anbar. Consider the devastating assessment in the late summer of that
year completed by Col. Pete Devlin, the G-2 of the 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force (I MEF). When his conclusions hit the front page
of the Washington Post in September—“Situation Called Dire in West
Iraq”—they rocked the White House.
Here is the opening salvo from that account: “The chief of
intelligence for the Marine Corps in Iraq recently filed a secret report
concluding that the prospects for securing … Anbar province are dim
and there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do.” Tom Ricks, who
wrote the story, went on to note that one official familiar with the
report said it “describes Anbar as beyond repair.” Another said “it
concludes that the United States has lost in Anbar.”1
Then in November, Devlin produced an update. It “said much
of the same things” as its August antecedent.2 Statistics don’t lie, goes
the old adage. And the G-2 could cite the growing number of violent
attacks to support his position. They all pointed in the same direction.
In these grim assessments of Anbar in 2006, ground zero was
the city of Ramadi. Marines and soldiers who served in Anbar often
referred to Ramadi as “al Qaedastan,” and with good reason. The city
experienced a higher rate of weekly attacks than anywhere else in Iraq.
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) controlled all of Ramadi except for the

1

Thomas Ricks, “Situation Called Dire in West Iraq,” Washington Post,
September 11, 2006
2
Col. Peter Devlin, oral history interview conducted by Kurtis Wheeler for the
U.S. Marine Corps History Division, January 31, 2007, transcript, 9.
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embattled Government Center, which was held by a company of
Marines.
On the mean streets of the capital, AQI ruled mercilessly. Tales
of their cruelties were endless. And they enforced a forbidding and
puritanical code of behavior on the local populace. Men could not
shave. Girls could not go to school. Music was forbidden. Beauty
parlors were closed. Get caught smoking and you could lose your
fingers.
The situation in fall 2006 looked hopeless. But on September 6,
2007, an event occurred in Ramadi that would have been beyond the
wildest of imaginations a year earlier. The mayor of the capital gave the
signal for the start of what had been up to 2002 the city’s annual 5K
race. Runners were going to compete once more on a course that runs
through the winding streets of Ramadi, ending at the Government
Center. In less than 12 months, Ramadi had been transformed from the
most dangerous city in Iraq to one safe enough for its city fathers to
sponsor a 5K race!
How did such a transformation take place? This remarkable
turn of events came about because of the course of action initiated by I
MEF as it took over Anbar in the spring of 2006. It changed the
concept of operations for the fight against the insurgency. In 2007, the
2nd Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) built on and expanded what
I MEF initiated.
And by the time I MEF returned in to Anbar in early 2008 for
its third round in the Sunni heartland, things had dramatically changed,
recalled its commander, Maj. Gen. John Kelly. The province was
remarkably different from the one he left after his initial deployment in
2004 as the assistant commander of the 1st Marine Division. At that
time, the division found itself in a rapidly escalating and bloody fight.
Kelly recalled that when he left Iraq in early 2005 “there were roughly
400 violent events a week in Anbar.” But “when I returned in February
2008 that number was down to 50 attacks per week.”3
3

Maj. Gen. John Kelly, presentation at Fletcher School (Tufts University)
roundtable, “Marine Generals Discuss Anbar 2006,” May 2, 2010,
http://www.fletcher.tufts.edu/issp/Video.shtml.
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By the end of 2008, Kelly asserted that Anbar had advanced
well into the post-conflict phase to normalcy. Violent actions “were
down to eight or nine a week.” And that number “held for the last five,
six months” of the year: “AQI had to commute into Anbar to blow
something up … If they tried to stay in a city the people very quickly
would identify them.” That told the general it was now “appropriate to
use the term victory in Anbar.”4
Victory in Anbar! How did the Marines do it? And how were
they able to do so a year before the success of the Surge and the
counterinsurgency strategy upon which it was based? When I MEF first
deployed to Anbar in March 2004, its campaign plan bore little
resemblance to the conflict in which it soon found itself embroiled. By
the end of that year, the fight settled into a deadly and protracted
business as the insurgency burgeoned. And, as noted above, by the fall
of 2006 many had given up on Anbar.
And still the Marines prevailed. What allowed them to do so?
Why were they able to learn and adapt? And how should we understand
the different elements of the three-dimensional strategy they employed
there, which was an outgrowth of Marine learning and adapting? To
answer these questions we will employ a diagnostic construct drawn
from the literature on organizational learning. Propositions and
concepts found in those texts provide analytic tools that can help
decipher and comprehend the outcome in Anbar.
A. How Organizations Learn
The texts on organizational learning and change are dominated
by the business and management disciplines.5 There also is a segment
of the literature in security studies that addresses the related subjects of

4

Ibid.
Among the most often cited are ones by Chris Argyris and Peter Senge, as
well as the classic studies of James March. See, for example, Argyris, On
Organizational Learning (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1999); Senge,
The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (New
York: Doubleday, 1990); and March, Decisions and Organizations (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1991) and Organizations, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
5
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military learning6 and innovation.7 A common theme running through
these studies is the axiom that learning, innovation, and change comes
hard to large organizations in general, and to military ones in particular.
Roadblocks to Change
What are the barriers that make change in military
organizations problematical? In a recent study, Lifting the Fog of
Peace, Janine Davidson identified three prevailing explanations of why
adapting and innovating is so difficult.8 The first two are drawn from
organizational and bureaucratic theory.9 Those utilizing organizational
theory to assess military institutions find innate rigidity and strong
resistance to change. This is attributed to the formalized norms,
standard operating procedures, and routine ways that large
organizations do things. Those processes often serve as barriers to
change. They throw up Chinese walls that constitute acute obstructions,
seriously hindering adaptation.10
6

See Richard Downie, Learning From Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam,
El Salvador, and the Drug War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998); John Nagl,
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2002); Janine Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2010); and Gordon Sullivan and Michael Harper, Hope is Not
a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America’s Army (New
York: Random House, 1996).
7
See Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and
Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984);
Stephen Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Deborah Avant, "The Institutional
Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars," International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (December 1993) and Elizabeth Kier,
Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997)
8
Davidson summarizes the organizational theory explanation as follows: “in
this model, even when actors within a military organization desire a change in
strategy or doctrine, structural mechanisms would likely mitigate against it.”
Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace, Chpt. 1.
9
These have their origins in Graham Allison’s classic study of decision
making and his utilization of the texts on organizational behavior to explain
the Cuban missile crisis: Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).
10
Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace, p. 11.
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Bureaucratic politics specialists find yet other impediments to
change. Davidson notes that “military leaders, like the leaders of other
large organizations, seek to promote the importance of their
organization and to preserve the organization’s distinct organization
essence” or central mission. Challenges to that central mission are
likely to be resisted unless the leadership comes to see that change will
“enhance the importance and influence of the organization.”11 More
Chinese walls!
Finally, there are the constraints imposed by organizational
culture. Specialists on the topic like Richard Downie find that
institutional memory and history, key factors that shape organizational
culture, frequently impede the organization’s capacity to innovate and
change. “When the norms, SOPs, and doctrines” of an organization
“become widely accepted and practiced” they will “form … the
organization’s institutional memory.” That memory is then socialized
into its members, making the organization “normally resistant to
change.” 12 Yet more Chinese walls!
In spite of these impediments, large organizations can learn and
change. Davidson finds that militaries “change in response to three
catalysts: (1) external pressure, (2) the opportunity or need to grow
and/or survive, and (3) failure.”13 But innovation does not “happen
easily or automatically” because “militaries tie their cultural identities
to specific roles or have career structures that fail to reward (or even
punish) new ways of thinking.”14
In Anbar, the Marine Corps bucked these impediments to adapt
and change. To understand why they were able adapt and employ a
three-dimensional strategy that included the “clear, hold, build” phases
of counterinsurgency, tribal engagement to solidify local security, and
counterterrorism operations to attack the insurgent’s secret
11

Ibid., p. 13. Also see Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1967) and James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy (New York: Basic Books,
1989).
12
Downie, Learning From Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El
Salvador, and the Drug War, p. 23-24.
13
Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace, p. 12.
14
Ibid., p. 18-19.
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underground network, a brief discussion of the tenets of organizational
learning is necessary.
The Learning Process
Many definitions of organizational learning can be found in
business and management texts. But for our purposes it is Richard
Downie’s that is best suited for assessing the Marine campaign in
Anbar. An organization demonstrates an aptitude to learn, he proposes,
when it “uses new knowledge or understanding gained from experience
to adjust institutional norms, doctrine, and procedures in ways designed
to minimize gaps in performance and maximize future successes.”15
This description captures the essence of what it means to be a learning
organization.
Barbara Levitt and James March magnify what Downie
proposes. They describe organizational learning as “routine-based,
history-dependent, and target-oriented. Organizations are seen as
[demonstrating] learning by encoding inferences from history into
routines that guide behavior.” Where do those inferences come from?
Learning organizations draw them from “direct experience” and from
“the experience of others.” Having done so, they “develop conceptual
frameworks or paradigms for interpreting that experience” and turning
it into a usable guide for future action by encoding and storing it in the
organization’s memory.16
These two definitions serve as the starting point for assessing
why an organization does or does not learn. Institutional learning
15

Downie, Learning From Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El
Salvador, and the Drug War, p. 22.
16
Barbara Levitt and James March, “Organizational Learning,” Annual Review
of Sociology (1988), p. 319. Since it was published, it has come to be
considered one of the seminal works on organizational learning. According to
one assessment, it “has been cited more than 3,000 times in a wide variety of
other literatures and by essentially every subsequent article seeking to build or
contribute to the literature on learning. The paper makes a major theoretical
contribution by re-framing a large subset of the broader literature on
organizations in terms of organizational learning in ways that provide a
synthetic foundation for further work.”
http://acawiki.org/Organizational_learning.
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theory, Downie explains, describes “the systemic process by which
organizations either learn and change their doctrine, norms, or standard
procedures to act on that learning or disregard the information and
retain their doctrine, norms, and standard operating procedures.”17
This systemic process is illustrated by learning theorists
through models depicting a cyclical course of action that involves
several steps. The illustration in Figure 1 was developed by Downie to
study U.S. Army doctrinal change.18

Figure 1: The Institutional Learning Cycle
Downie’s model outlines the steps in the process through
which learning and adaptation is possible. It begins with members of
the organization recognizing that there are performance gaps that can
17

Downie, Learning From Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El
Salvador, and the Drug War, p. 34.
18
Ibid., p. 38.
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only be redressed through adaptation and change. To do so, the
organization has to acquire and process information in order to pinpoint
alternatives.19 Based on these developments, the “organization assesses
and interprets the discoveries or evaluations made by individual
members, and if deemed valid through consensus, explores options to
resolve the anomalous situation.” Resolution of those anomalies will
take the form of actions that “adapt organizational behavior” through
changes in organizational “norms, doctrine, or SOPs.”20
The cyclical process just described outlines the steps by which
an organization can learn and adapt. But what the learning literature
tells us is that the real world contains many factors that undermine this
prototype in various ways. And many of those factors have their origins
in the nature and structure of the organization itself. Nevertheless, it is
possible to deduce from that literature the characteristics or attributes
that, if present in an organization, can facilitate learning, adaptation,
and change.
Characteristics of Learning Organizations
Organizations that successfully navigate the learning cycle
illustrated above to successfully address performance gaps have the
following six characteristics.
First, they place a high premium on adaptation and change.
These are key organizational norms—core competences—and not just
platitudes. They are a part of the organization’s foundation and
disposition, and serve as a prescribed way of thinking and acting.
According to Peter Senge, this becomes part of the personality of the
organization.21

19

Davidson notes that “some organizations actively promote the collection and
dissemination of new information, while others rigidly adhere to standard
operating procedures and ignore new information—especially if that
information challenges existing paradigms and norms.” Lifting the Fog of
Peace, p. 19-20
20
Downie, Learning From Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El
Salvador, and the Drug War, p. 34-35.
21
Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning
Organization.
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Second, a proficiency to innovate, improvise, and respond to
the unexpected is socialized into the members of the organization.
Members learn roles, methods, and modes of behavior that prepare
them to respond to unexpected and unforeseen challenges. Nagl
believes that military organizations can be prepared in this manner. He
found that this was true for the British army during the colonial period.
It was structured “precisely to deal with the unexpected” and was
“actively expected to innovate.”22
Third, organizations that are able to manage uncertainty are
equipped with “tools … to make sense of the situations they face.”23
These include, explains Senge, the capacity to acquire and analyze the
necessary information and knowledge in order to make adjustments to
the mission.24
Fourth, the acquisition of information and knowledge initially
comes from direct experience. March and Levitt call this “learning by
doing.” A second source is through study. Davidson terms the
combination of these two methods “experiential learning”: “hands-on
activities” and “intellectual reflection (reading, listening, and
thinking).” A third method is that of understanding gained through an
organization’s informal networks, where the voluntary sharing of
“ideas and solutions” takes place.25
Fifth, routines capture these learning experiences over time and
embed them into the organization through socialization, education, and
professionalization. March and Levitt explain that organizations do so
by “encoding inferences … into routines that guide behavior.” Routines
include the “rules, procedures, conventions, strategies, and technologies
around which organizations are constructed and through which they
operate.”26
Sixth, memory is likewise a key institutional characteristic of a
learning organization. Lessons from past experiences are codified into
22

Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, p. 220-21.
Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning
Organization, p. 5.
24
Ibid.
25
Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace, p. 25-26.
26
Levitt and James March, “Organizational Learning,” p. 320.
23
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memory, which can be consulted, retrieved, and utilized. They become
not just “standards of good professional practice” but a “shared
perceptions of the way things are done around here.”27
B. Anbar Case Study
The characteristics of a learning organization provide a
diagnostic construct through which to assess how the Marine Corps
was able to adapt and succeed in Anbar. All military institutions are
steeped in tradition and develop idiosyncratic cultures that shape the
way they operate. This is true of the Marine Corps. And a mainstay
among Corps tradition is the premium placed on learning and adapting
as a core competency.
In First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps,
Victor Krulak underscored this commitment to learning and adapting.
He did so through a number of historical examples that run the gambit
from imaginative changes in strategy and operational concepts to the
development of inventive weaponry and equipment. What stands out in
each vignette is learning and adapting.28 Krulak identifies several
attributes “that constitute the identity of the Marine Corps.”29 Three of
these include the capacity to think and reflect, to innovate, and to
improvise, all of which correlate with organizational learning.
Moreover, because Marines expect to be first in the fight,
Krulak explains, they assume they will find themselves initially
engaged without a clear understanding of the context or the enemy. The
“war you prepare for,” writes Krulak, “is rarely the war you get.”30 As a
result, Marines learn roles, methods, and modes of behavior to respond
to situations marked by ambiguity, uncertainty, and unforeseen
challenges.
This approach is infused into training and professional
education. James Warren observes in his USMC combat history how,
beginning at the Basic School for officers, “training exercises” foster
27

Ibid.
Victor Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps
(Annnapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999).
2929
Ibid. See parts I-III.
30
Ibid., p. 137.
28
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“adaptability, boldness, and self-criticism.”31 And through formal and
informal study of their history, Marines learn that these core principles
have served them well. The Marine Corps is “history-dependent,”
which is consistent with March and Levitt’s observation that a key part
of learning involves “encoding inferences from history into routines
that guide behavior.”32
In sum, the Marine Corps appears to have an organizational
culture that underscores learning and embeds lessons from its history
into the Corps memory. That history is rife with examples of at first
being caught in the fog of war—but then, having learned from
knowledge gained in the fight, being flexible enough to make
adjustments, overcome gaps in performance, and be successful.
The narrative that follows seeks to explain how the Marine
Corps was able to successfully adapt and change in Anbar by tracing
the process through which their campaign unfolded between 2004 and
2008. The study will highlight key junctures where learning and
adapting took place and change followed. It finds that the
organizational culture of the Marine Corps, and its attention to the
tenets of learning outlined above, played an important role in the Anbar
campaign. The case study will be divided into the following parts:
 Part two describes the background and contest to the conflict. It
begins with an overview of Anbar, highlighting its cultural, social
and political identity. This is followed by a chronicling of the
policy mistakes the U.S. made in 2003 in Iraq and how those
missteps set the conditions for the fight between the insurgents and
the Marines.
 Part three provides profiles of the actors involved in the
conflict. It begins with the armed groups that made up the
insurgent coalition that emerged in Anbar in 2003–2004. Who
were they, and what were their aims and goals? How were they
organized, and how did they operate? What were the differences
between the insurgent factions? Next is described the composition
31
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of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and how it prepared
for its initial deployment to Anbar in the spring of 2004 and the
fight that ensued during that year.
 Parts four to six present an operational-level analysis of the
Marine campaign in Anbar. That fight with the insurgents is
assessed through the analytic lens of organizational learning and
adaptation. A systematic examination of the changes in the
strategies executed by the different MEFs over the four years
period is untaken. The goal is to bring to light how the Marines
learned and adapted and ultimately prevailed in the midst of a
brutal irregular war that they did not initially understand, and how
they brought together a three-dimensional strategy to do so. That
strategy, which consisted of the counterinsurgency phases of
“clear, hold, build,” tribal engagement to expand the operating
force available to the MEFs to ensure local security, and targeted
counterterrorism aimed at degrading al Qaeda’s clandestine
apparatus, were all critical to their success.
Other scholars have argued that success in Anbar was due
to only one or two of these dimensions. For example, Lindsey and
Petersen stress the role of tribal mobilization and write that Marine
learning in Anbar “proceeded through trial and error in the
absence of standardized COIN doctrine.”33 They are referring to
the fact that I MEF was well on its way to degrading AQI in Anbar
before FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, which served as the strategic
basis for the Surge, was finalized and officially released in
December 2006. But as will be seen in this narrative, I MEF’s
2006 campaign plan was based on the long-standing COIN
precepts of “clear, hold, and build.” They did not need FM 3-24
Counterinsurgency to tell them about it. Those precepts were well
understood by I MEF, but they had to be contextualized in their
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campaign plan for Anbar. And that entailed tribal engagement and
coordination with the counterterrorism units of Task Force 145.
 Part seven offers closing reflections, drawn from the narrative.
They are presented as informed observations taken from the Anbar
campaign that relate to the future conflict environment, the nature
of armed groups, and the efficacy of counterinsurgency as a
strategy for managing those challenges.

II. Background and Context
To fight successfully in the irregular warfare setting of Iraq’s
Al Anbar province, Marines needed a cultural understanding of the
local population, how they perceived and thought about their world,
and the ways in which they organized social and political relations to
survive in it. But the Marines deploying to Anbar in March 2004 were
not equipped with such an appreciation.
However, over the next four years they were able to gain an onthe-job understanding of Anbar and to put it to good use. In order to
appreciate what they learned to turn the situation around, it is necessary
to become familiar with the cultural values, social and political
groupings, and worldview of the people who live there—the Iraqi
Sunni Arabs. Their persona, which the Marines had to come to
understand and engage, is based on “ethnicity and language, religion,
tribal roots and membership, and historical experience.”34
A. Anbar Narrative
Located in central Iraq, Anbar province is the largest of Iraq’s
18 governorates. No one really knows how many people reside there.
Today, the estimates hover around two to three million. The population
is concentrated in seven of Anbar’s eight districts: Abu Graib, Fallujah,
34
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Ramadi, Hit, Haditha, Anah, and Al-Qa’im. Within these territories, the
majority of the residents live in the cities and towns that dot the
Euphrates River.
To operate in Anbar, one must come to know the longstanding
beliefs and values that unite the Sunni Arabs that live there, shaping the
worldview through which they interpret events and take actions. Those
beliefs and values are derived from three sources: Bedouin tribal
traditions, Islam, and Arab culture.35 Awareness of these elements of
identity and how they interact with each other and the worldview they
foster is the starting point for engagement in Al Anbar.
Bedouin Traditions, Islamic Principles, and Arab Culture
Starting in the 1960s, social scientists predicted that tribes and
clans found in traditional societies were passing from the world scene
in the wake of modernity.36 Evidently, the tribes in Anbar did not get
the word, because when the U.S. intervened in 2003 they were still
around, operating on principles of behavior that lie deep in their
Bedouin roots. Anbar’s Dulaymi tribal confederation’s communal rules
and ethos are illustrative. Solidarity, loyalty, and honor are keystones of
their tribal value system.
These values took root long ago and shaped a code of behavior
that remains embedded in the character of present-day Anbar tribes.
Indeed, the modern-day adherents of these precepts often follow rather

35
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exacting conventions that creates a deep sense of responsibility to the
tribe.
For example, bringing to justice anyone who violates
individual or group honor is central to this ethos. Revenge, blood feuds,
and even war can serve as the means for addressing such
transgressions. Often, revenge is formally prescribed as the duty of all
of the tribes’ male members.37 Nonviolent means can also be employed
to settle disputes. Among other Bedouin traditions maintained by the
tribes of Anbar is respect for martial feats, military achievement, and a
readiness to resort to the use of force.38
Islam likewise has had a major influence on Anbar’s tribes. To
understand the Islamic element of the tribes’ identity, the Marines
deploying in 2004 needed to drill down. What they would have found
is that no one interpretation of Sunni Islam exists. Rather, most Sunnis
subscribe to one of four main schools of thought—Maliki, Shafi’i,
Hanbali, and Hanafi—and knowing which one predominates in Anbar
is crucial.
The differences among these four perspectives turn on how
stringently Islamic principles are interpreted and practiced. The strictest
is the Hanbali school, established in the ninth century. Its popularity
has fluctuated since its founding. In modern times it reemerged, first in
the nineteenth century with the Wahhabis and then in the twentieth
century in the guise of the Salafi Islamic revival.
The Salafi movement is made up of Sunni Muslims drawn
mainly from the Hanbali school. Many of the most puritanical groups
found in the Muslim world are Salafis. It is important to note that the
vast majority are nonviolent. While they believe in a strict adherence to
the Quran and the Sunna, they do not advocate the use of violence
against those who do not accept their beliefs.39 However, some Salafists
do, and today they include al Qaeda and its associated movements.
37
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The tribes that make up the Dulaymi confederation in Anbar
are not Hanbalis or their Salafi offshoot. Rather, they are largely
Hanifas, the most liberal of the four schools.40 Generally known to be
more moderate in their Islamic orientation, Hanafis are considered the
school most receptive to modern ideas. Such an understanding had
operational significance to Marines deploying to Anbar in 2004.
Finally, Arab culture is the third element of the identity puzzle
that shapes the worldview of the inhabitants of Anbar. The identity of
Iraq’s Sunni Arabs is deeply influenced by the narrative of modern
Arab ethno-nationalism. They had lived for centuries under Ottoman
domination and, following World War I, within a British-imposed state
legitimized by the League of Nations.
The state that finally emerged in Iraq in 1932 was dominated
by Arab Sunni elites. The details of this will not be recounted here. We
need only note that from that time until 2003, the Sunnis ruled the Iraqi
state based on an identity that featured modern Arab nationalist themes
that included a fierce sense of independence and resistance to outside
interference.
These three enduring elements of identity—Bedouin tribal
traditions, Islam, and Arab culture—have each reinforced a selfperception of Anbar’s Sunni tribes as an elite community, superior to
Iraq’s other ethnic and religious groups. And that self-perception was

Conflict & Terrorism, no. 3 (2006):207–39. The author divides Salafis into
three major Salafi factions: purists, politicos, and jihadis. In the article he
explains the sources of unity among these factions, as well as those factors that
separate them. The latter center on issues related to politics and violence. He
notes that “although Salafis share a common religious creed, they differ over
their assessment of contemporary problems and thus how this creed should be
applied.”
40
See Colin Turner, Islam: The Basics (London: Routledge, 2006); John
Alden Williams, The Word of Islam (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press,
1994); Annemarie Schimmel, Islam: An Introduction (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1992); John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight
Path (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); John L. Esposito, ed., The
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reinforced by the fact that Sunnis dominated Iraq’s social and political
order before and during the decades of Ba’athist rule.
Consequently, it should have come as no surprise that a sudden
loss of that status could translate into armed resistance if actions were
not taken to forestall it. Deciphering these elements of identity, how
they interact with each other, the beliefs and perceptions they generate,
and the rules of behavior they foster was the starting point for Marines
deploying to Anbar in March 2004.
Social Organization and Political Power
In the Middle East of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
imperial powers and indigenous strongmen regularly sought to
consolidate state power. Equally often they encountered stiff tribal
resistance to their centralizing schemes. The ability of tribes to resist
depended on the strength of their own solidarity, the political landscape
of the day, the power of occupiers or national authorities, and the
harshness of the times.
Within this context, tribal defiance constituted a longstanding
feature of the Iraqi landscape. More often than not, tribes turned back
assaults on their autonomy, as even Saddam and his Ba’athist cronies
found out.41 After seizing power, they immediately denigrated “sheikhs
and tribalism … as the epitome of backwardness.” Both stood in the
way of “building a new society” and “creating a [new] Arab man.”
Sheikhs were gunned down or jailed, and tens of thousands of tribal
people were forced to relocate to cities. Using tribal names was
forbidden.42
In spite of these brutal measures, tribalism remained the core
around which local Iraqi society revolved. Out of necessity, Saddam
not only had to accept that reality but also depend on it to survive two
disastrous wars of his own making. From the Sunni Triangle he
41
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recruited men to fill the leadership ranks of the Republican Guards, the
Special Republican Guards, and the various other intelligence and
security units. And the tribes of the Dulaymi confederation of Anbar
provided more than their share, which brought many advantages.
However, gaining status had its downside, for Saddam automatically
saw the confederation as posing a threat. Living in constant fear of
losing control to the same kind of cabal he had helped orchestrate in the
past, Saddam inflicted periodic bloodlettings on the Dulaymis to
prevent such subterfuge, whether real or imagined.
While Operation Iraqi Freedom swept Saddam from power, it
did not alter the social context in Anbar. Sunni tribes and sheikhs
retained their local authority, power, and guns. Their militias remained
intact and were strengthened by returning cashiered Iraqi Army vets.
The tribe remained the principal social organization and source of
political power.
Consequently, an important question for the U.S. in 2003 was
how the tribes of Anbar would react to regime change, especially when
it meant the loss of power and status. Those tribes were the center of
gravity in the province; they were the central social and political unit
long before and during Ba’athist rule. And they remained pivotal in the
power vacuum that followed Saddam’s demise.
The central U.S. goal should have been to keep them out of the
hands of both the former regime elements and the Salafi jihadists led by
Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi. Each had taken up arms against U.S. forces. If
either was to turn resistance into a robust and protracted struggle in
Anbar, it needed the help of the tribes. They were essential if a dogged
fight against U.S. occupation was to be waged.
Tribal Engagement
It was not written in the stars that either the former regime
elements or Zarqawi and the Salafi Jihadists would form a viable
coalition with the tribes of Anbar. Those tribes were not the natural
allies of either. But to be able to prevent such alliances form forming,
the U.S. had to engage the Anbar tribes on their terms, based on their
narrative. And that required developing a tribal engagement strategy
that reflected an understanding of that narrative. The operational do’s
29
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and don’ts contained in Figure 2 constituted the foundation, the
indispensable starting point, of that engagement strategy.
No such understanding informed the calculus of the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) in the days and months following
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Rather, the CPA and its head, Paul Bremer,
made all the wrong moves in 2003 when it came to Anbar. It would be
left to the Marines in 2004 to pick up the pieces. But to do so, they had
to base their operational plans on an understanding of the cultural
context of Anbar and how to work inside the tribal system that
dominates the human terrain found there. This would prove to be no
easy task.
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Figure 2: Operational Do’s and Don’ts for Tribal Engagement
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B. All the Wrong Moves
Just before entering Iraq as part of the 2003 American
intervention to oust Saddam, a young Marine asked then Brig. Gen.
John Kelly what would happen to Iraq after the coalition forces beat the
Iraqi military. As he recounted later, Kelly had a confident response:
“Well, we’re America, the greatest nation on Earth. There is probably
battalions worth of engineers and specialists and all that, and as we
move north and take the regime down, they’ll come in behind us and
they’ll establish democracy and take over the running of the country.”43
But the battalions of specialists never followed. Planning for
the Iraq war focused on overthrowing Saddam Hussein. The
administration never developed a clear plan of what should happen the
next day. Rather than facilitating the transition to reconstruction, postconflict actions actively set that process back and threw fuel on a
budding violent resistance to U.S. occupation. In 2003, the U.S. made
all the wrong moves, and this had a serious impact on Anbar Province.
The story of the failure of pre-war planning for the “day after”
Saddam was ousted has been told in several volumes.44 The story of
retired Gen. Jay Garner and the Office of Humanitarian and
Reconstruction Assistance (OHRA) will not be recounted here. Suffice
it to say they lacked the resources necessary to do almost anything. And
then, at the end of April, Garner was replaced by L. Paul Bremer.
Bremer had little knowledge of Iraq and no experience in postconflict reconstruction. But under his direction of the CPA, the
American occupation took hold. In doing so, he was at the center of
several ill-conceived decisions that fueled armed resistance in Anbar.
What follows is a brief summation of those wrong moves.

43

Lt. Gen. John Kelly, presentation at the Fletcher School Roundtable “Marine
Generals Discuss Anbar 2006,” May 2, 2010. The session can be viewed at
http://www.fletcher.tufts.edu/issp/Video.shtml.
44
See David Phillips, Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008); Larry Jay Diamond, Squandered
Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring
Democracy to Iraq (New York: Henry Holt, 2005); Jay Garner, “The Lost
Year in Iraq,” Frontline interview transcript,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/truth/interviews/garner.html.

32

Shultz: Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps
Purging the Ba’athists
Bremer’s first major decision set the tone. On May 16, 2003,
he released a blanket de-Ba’athification edict. Order 1 dissolved the
Ba’ath Party, removed the four most senior ranks from their jobs, and
banned them from working for the government in the future; it also
forbade all former Ba’athists, even junior members, from serving in the
top three levels of government.45
According to Bremer, the order affected 20,000 people.46
Others estimated that 40,000 or 60,000 Ba’ath Party members lost their
jobs; given the impact of unemployment on families, the number
affected was several times that.47 Anthony Cordesman later said:
“Nobody [in the CPA] made any effort to survey how many people
would be excluded … it went down to far.”48 And it took a heavy toll
on governance. 49
The biggest losers were the Sunnis. Gone were their jobs, their
family income, their children’s schoolteachers, and their role in
governance. Moreover, the decision sent a mailed fist to Anbar
province and the Sunni Triangle: The postwar order was about
removing Sunnis from national life. And as they looked to Baghdad,
the Sunnis saw the U.S. putting the Shia in their place.
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Cashiering the Army
Bremer’s second major decision was to disband the Iraqi
Army, demobilizing 250,000 to 350,000 personnel. CPA Order 2 sent a
dark message to the Sunni-dominated officer corps, who
unceremoniously lost paychecks and prestige. This move ran counter to
standard thinking about how to handle combatants in post-conflict
operations. According to one U.S. army colonel knowledgeable in these
matters, “Anyone who has done post-conflict work says do not get rid
of the military. You’ve got to control them. If you don’t control them,
you don’t know what they’re going to do.”50 But with Order 2, the CPA
sent into the streets of Iraq thousands of unemployed armed men.
Bremer later announced a plan to pay stipends to out-of-work
soldiers, but by that time the damage had been done. 51 The dissolution
of the Iraqi Army sent a second foreboding message to the Sunnis of
Anbar and beyond, who already felt marginalized.
Writing off the Tribes and Sheikhs
Bremer wrote in his memoir that he knew from diplomatic
service in Afghanistan and Malawi how important tribes are in some
countries. During his time in Iraq, he said he came to see how
important tribal ancestry was to many Iraqis. But he seems to have also
believed that tribal leaders would just go along with the new power
configuration in Baghdad. “The tribes had a reputation for respecting
power and had always been acutely aware of who was up and who was
down. They were likely to support whoever exercised authority in
Baghdad,” he wrote.52 The history of Iraq would suggest otherwise.
The attitude at the CPA was that to empower tribal leaders
would take Iraq backwards. They were the antithesis of the modern
regime Americans wanted to build. Noah Feldman, an advisor to the
CPA in 2003, later recounted that tribal leaders had come to Bremer
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offering to work with the CPA to help stabilize the country. “We told
them, ‘No, we’re not going to take Iraq back to the Middle Ages.’”53
Instead of working with the tribal leaders, the U.S. in 2003
followed policies that alienated them. This was certainly true in
Anbar.54 The idea that the traditional power of the Anbar sheikhs
should be engaged to work with the CPA simply didn’t resonate with
the powers in Baghdad. Just the opposite was the case. This was made
clear in Bremer’s 2003 CPA-issued statement that “tribes are a part of
the past” and “have no place in the new democratic Iraq.”55
Limiting Anbar Resources
While Anbaris were being swept up in arrests and the military
focus on kinetic tactics was inspiring anger, what they did not see early
on were the basic bread-and-butter services that build goodwill and
form the core of post-conflict program—jobs, electricity, government
services, and more. And thenm after reconstruction aid arrived, the
CPA sought to be even-handed with its use. What that meant was
regions favored by Saddam got far less than they were used to. A case
in point was electricity.
Before the war, Saddam distributed electrical power much as
he distributed political power. Places where he was strong got almost
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all the power they needed, while the Shiite south was left in the dark. 56
To the CPA, that was unfair. Bremer signed an order requiring that
electricity be evenly distributed.57 This effort to be even-handed, while
laudable in principle, meant that in the Sunni triangle power levels fell
to half of prewar levels.58
From Anbar, Col. David Teeples wrote to Bremer to plead for
more electricity, saying that the province’s supply is “our largest
concern,” citing rolling blackouts and “turbulence within the
community.” The lack of sufficient electricity in Anbar, Teeples wrote,
was preventing factories from opening, spurring unemployment.59 It
was another grim signal to the Sunnis of Anbar: Their fate in the “new
Iraq” was going to be a dark one.
Failure to Manage Sunni Fear
While Sunnis comprise only one-fifth of the Iraqi population,
they have dominated the country’s politics for hundreds of years. They
had a lot to lose with the invasion. And with de-Ba’athification and the
disbanding of the Iraqi Army, they did lose their traditional roles in
national institutions, their income, their personal self-identity, and
more. Moreover, they saw the Shia not just taking control of Baghdad’s
power ministries but also asserting authority in those institutions that
affect day-to-day life.
In 2003, the CPA focused on gaining Shia support and keeping
Kurdish support at the expense of managing Sunni fears. The CPA
sought to correct Saddam’s wrongs by favoring the once-oppressed
Shiites and Kurds at the expense of the once-ruling Sunnis. These
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actions fed Sunni fears. What were needed were policies to manage
those fears.
Marine Lt. Gen. John Allen, who played a key role in the
campaign in Anbar that led to the defeat of the al Qaeda-dominated
insurgency, reflecting back on the policies described here as having
created in 2004 “a perfect storm across Anbar,” providing “the perfect
opportunity for AQ [al Qaeda].”60 The U.S. had made all the wrong
moves and it was left to the Marines, who were sent to Anbar in March
2004, to to pick up the pieces.

Overarching Case Discussion Questions
1. “The war you prepare for is seldom the war you get.”
a. If this is true, what does this case study and your
experience suggest are the enduring principles that
operational and strategic leaders need to build into
their planning processes?
b. What key tools help operational and strategic leaders
adapt to “the war they get?”
2. This case study deliberately focuses on just one organization’s
experience in one region in Iraq, the USMC in Anbar, but the
applicability should be more generalizable.
a. Are the Marines the only branch of the military that
meets the six characteristics of a learning organization?
Are the characteristics of a learning organization
compatible with the structure and mindset of other
branches of the military and intelligence communities?
If not, can and should they be?
b. How does this learning model compare to adaptive
business models?
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c. What are the strengths and weaknesses of building
adaptation into an organization? What factors does this
capability depend on for success?
d. How does this model compare to the learning cycle of
armed groups (the insurgents in this case study)? Do
they learn faster, adapt faster, or do they face similar
bureaucratic and practical limitations? What forces
them to adapt, and what can we learn from their
experience?
3. What was the effect of other factors in the success of the
USMC in Anbar? This case study argues that success in Anbar
was based on three pillars: USMC adaptation, the “Anbar
Awakening” tribal movement, and the work of the special
operations forces’ Task Force 145. Each had a particular role to
play, and this case study identifies the roles and the interaction
between these three factors. Key discussion questions include:
a. What was the role of internal tribal dynamics and
rivalries in the willingness of the Anbar tribes to work
with the USMC? (See Section V.)
b. What was the effect of the special operations forces’
Task Force 145 in helping to set the conditions for
success in Anbar? (See Section VI.)
c. How did the USMC’s learning model help them to
capitalize on these opportunities?
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III. Insurgents and Marines
Those elements that came to comprise the insurgency in Anbar
were not natural allies. They had differences in terms of why they took
up arms and in the aims and goals they pursued. This is not surprising,
given the history of insurgency, which has often been characterized by
factional and internal rivalries that affect cohesion, cooperation, and
effectiveness.
The different groups that comprised the insurgency in Anbar
followed this historical pattern. As will be delineated later, these
differences would eventually come to be seen by the Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) leadership as opportunities to exploit. But
that understanding took time to materialize.
A. The Insurgents
The insurgency in Anbar included different groups of which
there was considerable information on some, but next to nothing on
others. This is not unusual in the shadowy world of armed groups. They
are divided into two categories here: insiders and outsiders. The former
came from within Anbar’s Sunni Arab community, and are subdivided
as former Ba’athist regime elements and Sunni Arab rejectionists.
However, it should be noted that these distinctions “on the ground” in
Anbar were not so clear cut. Outsiders were comprised of foreign
radical Islamists. But here also things were not clear cut; there was a
homegrown element as well.
Insiders: Former Ba’athist Regime Elements
There was “compelling evidence,” writes Ahmed Hashim, that
former Ba’athist regime members played “significant political and
operational roles” in the insurgency in Anbar. While it was initially ad
hoc, as it developed they adopted the Sunni Arab nationalist discourse
as the motivation for armed resistance.61 Those who made up the
61
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former Ba’athist regime elements of the insurgency came from the key
coercive institutions that collectively kept the Ba’athist dictatorship in
power.62 They adopted several noms de guerre including the General
Command of the Armed Forces, Resistance and Liberation in Iraq; the
Patriotic Front; and the High Command of the Mujahideen in Iraq.
A July 2003 Ba’ath Party memo instructed these factions to
establish “small and closed cells” and “transition to covert
operations.”63 By early 2004 their attacks greatly escalated, and were
increasingly sophisticated. They made extensive use of improvised
explosive devices. Targets include police stations and other government
facilities, oil pipelines, electrical plants, and military convoys, as well
as Iraqi officials who cooperated with the U.S.
That the former Ba’athist regime elements refused “to go down
without a fight” was predictable. After all, they had everything to lose
and also had the capacity to organize clandestine networks. Their goal
was to raise the cost of remaining in Iraq for the U.S. and, ultimately, to
force Washington to withdraw.
Insiders: Sunni Rejectionists
Sunni Arab rejectionists came from different backgrounds and
joined the insurgency for different reasons. Their ranks included
members of regular army units. Dating back to the Iran war, the
professional officer’s corps of the army was drawn from Anbar and

support for the former regime,” and in some cases to express “antipathy…[for]
those associated with the former regime.” This was especially true for “those
with a more Islamist association.”Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and
Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 8990.
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other Sunni areas. Entire regiments came from Tikrit, Mosel, Ramadi,
and Fallujah.
The CPA cashiered them, along with the rest of the Army, and
had no disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program
to facilitate their transition to civilian life. DDR is difficult, even when
planned for and resourced. But to ignore it completely, as the CPA did,
drove former army officers into the ranks of the resistance out of
“shame and humiliation” and a desire “to repel the invaders and restore
sovereignty.”64
Rejectionists also came from within the Dulaymi tribal
confederation of Anbar. Their motives derived from longstanding tribal
traditions that reject authority imposed from Baghdad, as well as Iraqi
nationalism with its equally longstanding opposition to outside
invading forces. These traditions of hostility towards outside interlopers
and central authority were exacerbated by Sunni fear that in a new Iraq
they would be greatly discriminated against as retaliation for their
privileged status under Saddam Hussein. And the CPA did not help
matters by making little effort to reach out to them.
Also pushing the tribes to join the insurgency were U.S. tactics
that included the use of excessive force against insurgent hideouts in
Anbar. Not infrequently, these actions caused civilian casualties,
triggering among the affected tribes a blood revenge responsibility for
vengeance. Other missteps included the way U.S. forces searched
private homes and detained suspects. These actions, said a Fallujah clan
chief at the time, will make us “fight them to the death.”65
In sum, Sunni rejectionists joined the insurgency for reasons of
honor, tradition, revenge and national pride. To varying degrees, each
of these factors inspired them to take up arms.
Outsiders: Salafi Jihadists
The U.S. invasion turned Iraq into a magnet for fighters from al
Qaeda’s global Salafi jihad movement. As with Afghanistan in the
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1980s, they were quickly attracted to Iraq.66 The Afghan fight was the
initial defining moment for this movement, as Sageman explains:
“Militants from all over the Muslim world finally met and interacted
for lengthy periods of time. The common fight forged strong bonds
among them. After the Soviets withdrew, these militants started to
analyze their common problems within a more global perspective,
transcending their countries of origin.”67
In April 2003, Iraq became the central front in the Salafi global
war when bin Laden called for its warriors to join the fight there. Over
the next several months they started arriving on their own or via an
underground network that Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi helped establish
with indigenous Islamic radicals known as Ansar Al-Islam. Together
they began moving Islamist “zealots to northern Iraq.”68 The key point
of entry was through Syria.
Zarqawi, a former Afghan mujahideen, returned to Afghanistan
and established a training camp with funds in part provided by al
Qaeda. He created Tawhid al-Jihad as an affiliate of al Qaeda that prior
to 9/11 focused on Jordan, Israel, and Turkey. He also established
networks in Europe to raise funds and arrange for the clandestine transit
of Islamist fighters to various battle fronts. Zarqawi moved Tawhid alJihad to Iraq following the U.S. invasion and became AQ’s de facto
operational commander. While the size of his force was considered
small by U.S. officials, it carried out the grizzliest attacks.
In July 2003, Tawhid al-Jihad began an indiscriminate series of
bloody attacks. It detonated a car bomb against the Jordanian Embassy.
Next it sent a suicide attacker to the United Nations headquarters and
murdered the UN’s top envoy in Iraq. This was followed by the murder
of Shiite leader Muhammed Baqr al-Hakim. These actions gained
Zarqawi international notoriety as the mastermind of al Qaeda’s
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operations in Iraq. In October 2004, he declared his allegiance to bin
Laden.69
The Salafi jihadists in Iraq were comprised of both
internationalists and homegrown warriors. One assessment of the
former, drawn in early 2005 from Salafi websites, found the names of
foreign jihaidist fighters who died in Iraq. Of the 154 names posted, 33
were said to have died carrying out suicide attacks. Saudis constituted
60% of the foreign jihadists killed and 70% of the suicide bombers.70
Other records captured in Iraq for 2006–2007 show that Saudi Arabia
was by far the most common nationality in this sample; 41% (244) of
the 595 records that included the fighter’s nationality indicated they
were of Saudi Arabian origin. Libya was the next most common
country of origin, with 18.8% (112) of fighters listing their nationality
stating they hailed from Libya.71
Joining these international jihadists were their home-grown
counterparts. Several Salafi armed groups appeared in 2003, including
Ansar al-Sunnah and the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI). These groups
were made up of individuals “with ties to or admiration for Osama bin
Laden.” In Iraq, IAI “cooperated with Zarqawi’s group,” as did Ansar
al-Sunnah.72 They benefited from Zarqawi’s skilled jihadists who
worked on the ground with their Iraqi counterparts to provide training
and operational know-how.
B. 1st Marine Expeditionary Force
In March 2004, the Marine Corps deployed part of the 1st
Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) back to Iraq. It had first entered
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Iraq on March 20, 2003, crossing the Iraq-Kuwait border as part of the
coalition attack. On April 19, 2003, on the grounds of the dictator’s
Tikrit palace, the commander of I MEF, Lt. Gen. James Conway,
announced that full-scale combat operations were over. Until I MEF
departed in the summer, it was involved in SASO—security and
stability operations—in the Shia south. What they found there was an
infrastructure decimated by years of purposeful neglect.
SASO was not a mission for which it had prepared.
Nevertheless, Marine units adapted, and when it was over, those
involved were satisfied with the job they had done, believing they
helped the Shia start on the long road to recovery. According to then
Col. Joseph Dunford, who oversaw the SASO mission: “It worked
pretty well … Things were going well in the south. And in each one of
those cities … each of the commanders could point with some pride to
the accomplishments and the progress they made.”73
That experience, however, influenced how I MEF prepared for
its return to Iraq, according to Col. James Howcroft, who was its
intelligence chief at the time. “What we had done and the success we
had in southern Iraq definitely colored our approach to going back to
Anbar. We thought that what had worked in the south would work in
the west as well,” he noted.74 As a result, “[We] thought we didn’t need
artillery, we would not need tanks because we hadn’t needed them in
southern Iraq.”75 When asked how he assessed the security environment
in Anbar, Col. Howcroft said, “At the time it was considered generally
permissive except for certain pockets. We knew Fallujah was bad.”76
That assessment was reflected in I MEF’s campaign plan. It
was based on the following assumptions: (1) the environment in Anbar
was generally permissive and the population not hostile; (2) the
experience in southern Iraq would serve as the basis for the new effort;
(3) I MEF would build on what was believed to be a successful stability
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operation carried out by the 82nd Airborne, but they would do so in a
different and much less kinetic way; and (4) while they were likely to
face some hostility, it was not an organized resistance or insurgency.
Then Col. Dunford, the 1st Marine Division’s chief of staff, recalled
that during the planning “we were not talking about an insurgency at
this point … The word insurgency wasn’t used in the early part of
2004.”77
Based on those suppositions, the campaign plan that I MEF
drew up for Anbar left little doubt that its leadership believed they were
embarking on a stability operation. Figure 3 shows the “15 plays,” as
they were termed by the planners, that comprised that campaign plan.
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Figure 3: The “Five Plays”
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C. Ugly Surprise
I MEF found out quickly that its campaign plan was not what
the conditions in Anbar required. The environment was not permissive
but very kinetic. What accounted for this mismatch? The answer, in
part, lies in the intelligence the MEF used to prepare for deployment.
Reflecting back, the G-2 of I MEF explained that all the intelligence he
saw led him to conclude that Anbar “was generally permissive except
for certain pockets.” That was his bottom line at the time, based on
available intelligence.78
But even after I MEF was on the ground and realized it was not
SASO, understanding the conflict context remained a conundrum,
according to Brig. Gen. Kelly. He had a bird’s eye view of the evolving
situation in Anbar. But trying to figure out that complex setting was not
easy. As he watched the situation from Ramadi he posed the crucial
question, one that would stump U.S. forces deployed to Iraq and their
policy maker masters back in Washington for some time: “When do a
bunch of guys that are trying to kill you turn into an insurgency?” 79 In
other words, when do you know you are facing an organized
opposition, and how do you figure out who makes up its constituent
parts?
Gen. Kelly knew what he didn’t know! And I MEF found itself
facing one of those ambiguous, uncertain, and unforeseen challenges
that Marine forces have faced throughout the Corps history. Remember
Krulak’s observation in First to Fight. Once more, Marines were
engaged in a fight without a clear understanding of the context or of the
enemy. The situation I MEF prepared for was not the one that
confronted them in March 2004. Krulak’s warning proved true: The
“war you prepare for is rarely the war you get.”80
And if that was not bad enough, I MEF soon faced the Fallujah
crisis in Anbar. From April through the November assault that took
control of the city, the bulk of its forces were bogged down outside of
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Fallujah for political reasons. At the same time, the insurgency
burgeoned elsewhere in Anbar. There were just not enough I MEF
forces to go around. As a result, in more instances than not, the Marines
were reacting to insurgent moves. They did not have control of the
ground throughout the province. And in Fallujah, the enemy was given
a sanctuary from which to project operations for six months.
The fight had settled into a deadly version of the arcade game
Whac-a-Mole: Hit the insurgents hard in one location and they would
withdraw, only to pop up somewhere else. They were using classic
protracted irregular warfare tactics. Col. Howcroft, I MEFs intelligence
chief, clearly recognized the reality of this situation. He explained,
“Fallujah sort of put us back into our comfort zone and we did that
[urban battle] quite well.” But he added that, in terms of the larger
struggle for control of Anbar, “I think it truly, truly hurt us … We
needed time to set the conditions to be successful in Anbar.” Fallujah
prevented that from happening, and the insurgents capitalized on it. The
bottom line for the G-2: “Fallujah took that time away; it set us back a
year and a half, if not two years.”81 This would become apparent in
2005.

Discussion Questions
1. Col. Kelly asked, “When do a bunch of guys that are trying to
kill you turn into an insurgency?”
2. What is your answer to this?
3. Why is an insurgency more operationally and strategically
dangerous than a “bunch of guys”?
4. What are they key factors that help you identify that an
organized armed resistance has formed? (See CIWAG case
study Reading the Tea Leaves: Proto-Insurgency in Honduras
by John D. Waghelstein.)
5. What factors help to transform a “bunch of guys” into an
“insurgent organization”? What learning process do they need
to go through in order to transform and survive?
81
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6. The above section emphasizes that you have to ask the right
questions in order to find out the right answers, even when “the
only constant is that the unexpected will always be present in
the fight.”
7. How can we discover our knowledge gaps?
8. What are the key factors that the USMC needed to identify in
this situation? (See CIWAG case study An Operator’s Guide to
Human Terrain Teams by Norman Nigh.)
9. Do these factors depend on the situation, or can this framework
be developed into general guidelines?
10. How can we teach the capacity to learn? Can this be turned into
doctrine and the planning process? Or does this capability rest
in the hands of skilled individuals?

IV. Learning
Organizations able to manage uncertainty are equipped with
“tools … to make sense of the situations they face.”82 These include the
capacity to acquire appropriate information through firsthand
experience or learning by doing in order to make adjustments to the
mission. II MEF faced several key learning junctures in 2005, each of
which affected how II MEF understood the fight in Anbar. And each
had an important impact on how I MEF shaped its campaign plan for
going back in 2006, based on what II MEF learned in 2005.
A. Highly Persistent Conflict
When II MEF arrived in early 2005, Anbar was neither secure
nor stable. Rather, MEF intelligence concluded that the escalating
violence the province experienced in 2004 would persist in 2005. And
that “highly persistent unrest” quickly translated into casualties as soon
as Marines set boots on the ground.83 The province was, according to
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an Embassy/MNF-I National Coordination Team assessment, ground
zero for the insurgency.

Map 1: Iraq Provincial Stability, March 2006
Map 1 illustrates that in 2005 Anbar was the most perilous
Iraqi province in terms of level of violence and instability. In no place
was Sunni disaffection greater. It was within this context that AQI
sought to exploit the situation and take charge of the insurgency.
B. Assessing the Insurgency
For II MEF, gaining an understanding of insurgency was the
first order of business. The word from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
well into 2004 was that this faceless enemy was made up of just
“pockets of dead-enders,” only “small elements of 10 to 20 people, not
large military formations or networks of attackers.”84
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It did not look that way to II MEF. By 2005 the insurgency was
quite robust, comprised of the elements described above. It was at this
point that Al Qaeda made a power play to take it over and bend the
insurgency to its will. Recall that in 2004, the constituent elements of
the insurgency had formed into an alliance of convenience that had
different objectives.
From within the Sunni social order, Anbar sheikhs, imams, and
former Ba’athist military and civilian officials backed or joined
nationalist resistance groups. They did so to fight the American
occupation and to prevent what they believed was an impending Shia
onslaught. Aligning with them were international Salafi jihadists (and
their homegrown counterparts) who had designated Iraq as the central
front, the forward edge of the global battle in which to engage the
United States. They believed that by forcing the Americans to give up
the fight in Iraq, they could inflict a defeat of enormous consequences
on it. After doing so, they intended to establish a Salafi social order
there.
This was an alliance of convenience and not a natural
partnership. It was within this context that AQI sought to take control
of the insurgency in 2005. Its goals were different from those of the
Sunni nationalists. In 2003–2004, the latter had aligned with AQI and
facilitated the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq, giving them safe haven
in Anbar. In 2005, that partnership ended. AQI wanted control, not
collaboration, and it intended to take it by marginalizing the sheikhs
who backed the national resistance groups. They were part of the old
Iraq, not of the new religious order AQI intended to establish.
This sounded like the CPA decision to write the tribes and
sheikhs out of its own vision of the “new Iraq.” But the draconian
methods AQI intended to use to marginalize them were very different.
At the time Anbari sheikhs, disenchanted with the ruthless methods and
long-term intentions of their erstwhile partner, began to mount
opposition, AQI moved to viciously cut it off with a campaign of
murder and intimidation.
Al Qaeda believed such a campaign would overpower the
sheikhs and their tribesmen. What transpired instead was tribal
pushback. Evidently, AQI either forgot about tribal norms or, more
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likely, thought it could simply steamroll over them. First in Al Qaim
and then in Ramadi and elsewhere in Anbar, al Qaeda responded to
resistance by killing respected tribal leaders. As a result, sheikhs began
in early 2005 to approach the coalition forces and ask for help. But they
were turned down. According to then Col. Joe Dunford, “In the spring
of 2005, I met with dozens of sheikhs … They said they’d fight on our
side, but refused to go through the government in Baghdad. In [early]
2005, we weren’t willing to accept that deal.”85
Cooperation with the tribes was still proscribed. The decision
makers in Baghdad and Washington did not grasp the potential
strategic opportunity that splits in the insurgent ranks might offer to the
coalition. But by the fall, the Marine command in Anbar did. Those
tribal militias that constituted the rank and file of the nationalist
factions of the insurgency, as well as other tribal elements who were on
the sidelines of the fight, could be directed by their sheikhs to fight al
Qaeda.
What if the sheikhs ordered their men to do so in partnership
with the Marine and Army forces in the province? The II MEF
leadership began to see this as a potential game changer in Anbar.
C. II MEF’s 2005 Campaign Plan
The campaign plan for II MEF consisted of five lines of
operations to provide a framework for applying kinetic and non-kinetic
actions aimed at gaining control of the ground in Anbar. The plan
sought to separate the insurgents from the people, hold the ground, and
then carry out those civil reconstruction activities that win
counterinsurgency fights.
The first—security—was to establish safety for the population,
isolate the insurgents from the population, and provide civilian
agencies with the secure space needed to carry out those activities that
make victory attainable. Security was the “table setter.” It involved
clearing and holding those cities that ran along the Euphrates River
from Fallujah to Al Qaim. They were the most violent places in Iraq,
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each with substantial enemy presence. Security was the starting point.
Without it, the Marines could achieve little in Anbar.
The second—building the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)—was the
force multiplier that would allow II MEF to hold those cities and the
areas surrounding them. The Marines could clear, but only with ISF
could they hold and secure.
The next two—governance and economic development—
addressed those aforementioned activities that make victory attainable.
Governance creates a context that allows elected officials to administer
in an effective manner, to handle political grievances, and to provide
basic services. Economic development establishes the infrastructure
needed to support growth and provide the basics to achieve a decent
quality of life.
The final line of operations focused on information and
communication. These serve as the basis for developing a narrative,
which provides the driving logic for the overall campaign plan.
It was a comprehensive approach. But its starting point was
security. Without security, without that separation of the insurgents
from the people, those civil reconstruction activities would never get
off the ground. For II MEF, security involved clearing the Euphrates
River valley of major insurgent enclaves. According to Maj. Gen.
Stephen Johnson, Operation Sayeed was intended to do just that.
Consisting of “11 named operations under the Sayeed umbrella … the
purpose … was to drive al Qaeda from the western Euphrates River
Valley, and to eliminate it as a place where they could operate freely.”86
For the forces of II MEF, Operation Sayeed was all about the use of
highly lethal force to find and eliminate the insurgents.
D. Clear and Hold
It did not take II MEF long to learn that it could clear
insurgents out of one area after another but could not hold those areas
once they were cleared. This was true in each of Anbar’s three AOs
(operational areas)—Denver, Topeka, Raleigh—as depicted in Map 2.
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Each AO had either a Marine regimental combat team (RCT) or Army
brigade combat team (BCT) assigned to it. But in each AO, neither the
RCT nor the BCT had the forces necessary to clear and hold.

AO ATLANTA

منطقة عمليات اتالنتا
RAWAH
AL QA’IM

HUSAYBAH

HADITHAH

SYRIA
سوريا

BAGHDAD

POE WALEED

HIT

AO DENVER
AL ASAD

منطقة عمليات دنفر

RAMADI
FALLUJAH

AO TOPEKA
منطقة عمليات توبيكا

RUTBAH

AO RALEIGH
منطقة عمليات رالى

POE TREBIL
AO OSHKOSH
منطقة عمليات اوشكوش

JORDAN
االردن

MNF-W SECURITY AREA
منطة امنية للقوات المشتركة
SAUDI ARABIA
السعودية
UNCLASSIFIED

Map 2: Anbar’s Operational Areas

In AO Denver, RCT-2 sought to deny the insurgents the ability
to operate with impunity against the routes connecting Husaybah, Al
Qa’im, Rawah, Haditha, and Hit. Col. Stephen Davis, who commanded
RCT-2, intended to sweep the insurgents out of those cities and destroy
enemy networks and infrastructure. But AO Denver covered “30,000
square miles,” noted Davis. To cover it, he had “less than 3,400 people
in the entirety of the RCT.”87 The mission assigned RCT-2 was to “Go
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out there and disrupt and interdict.”88 And as soon as his battalions hit
the ground, they were involved in disruption and interdiction
operations.
But the results were always inconclusive. While initially a
success—the insurgents were rousted from their nests—it was only a
fleeting victory. They could remove a sanctuary, noted the commander
of RCT-2, “for a certain amount of time.” But the insurgents would be
back as soon as the Marines withdrew. RCT-2 did not have enough
forces to establish a lasting presence. “The enemy will go where we are
not, and that's just the hard facts of life,” said Davis.”89
The 2005 campaign plan called for “full spectrum counterinsurgency operations,” but as the year came to a close in AO Denver,
that goal remained elusive. The same was true in AO Raleigh for RCT8, said Lt. Col. William Mullen, the regiment’s chief of operations.
“We can go anywhere we want; we just can't stay there and maintain a
presence because of the fairly large size of the AO.”90 Throughout its
deployment, RCT-8 executed numerous large sweeps to drive the
insurgents out of their redoubts. But as in AO Denver, the enemy
would return as soon as they departed.
The insurgent center of gravity in Anbar was AO Topeka. And
within the AO, Ramadi was ground zero. The city and its environs were
an AQI stronghold. U.S. intelligence believed Zarqawi had his
headquarters north of the city. An Army BCT attached to II MEF had
responsibility for AO Topeka. In 2005 that was 2-2 BCT, which was
replaced by the 2-28 BCT in August.
Neither brigade had the capacity to clear, let alone hold,
Ramadi. Just to maintain a presence, 2-2 assigned three battalions.
Ramadi and its outskirts were geographically daunting because this
area spread along the Euphrates River for nearly 40 kilometers. Ramadi
was just too large to sweep and hold for 2-2 BCT. Its units were largely
restricted to a handful of bases, which gave the insurgents plenty of
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space to hide among Ramadi’s 500,000 residents. This included the
Government Center, which had been riddled with bullet holes from
countless firefights between coalition forces and insurgents. To
resupply it, the Marine battalion assigned to 2-2 had to fight their way
in and out. They were magnets for unrelenting insurgent fire.
By the summer of 2005, it was clear to II MEF’s leadership
that they were ensnared in a protracted irregular fight with an enemy
they had no way of subduing. They did not have the necessary forces to
clear and hold Anbar’s three AOs. They were in an endless game of
Whac-a-Mole. The way out of it, they thought, was to build up Iraqi
security forces in the province.
E. No ISF Solution
In 2005, the 1st and 7th Iraqi Army (IA) Divisions were
assigned to II MEF. The IA forces, along with local police, were seen
as the keys to establishing stability and control. But that goal, II MEF
was to learn, was out of reach in Anbar. The reasons for this had to do
with the composition of the 1st and 7th Divisions. They were
undermanned and largely comprised of Shiites, with some Kurds. That
made them persona non grata in the Sunni Triangle. The notion that
battalions comprised of non-Sunnis were going to live amongst the
people of Anbar and provide them with security was a non-starter in
2005.
Establishing local police forces in Anbar in 2005 proved even
more challenging. In November of 2004, all the police in the province
had been fired because of corruption, incompetence, or connections
with elements of the insurgency. Consequently, Maj. David Barnes, the
officer in charge of the Police Partnership Program, and his unit started
from scratch.
By the end of 2005, they had had some success in Fallujah,
which was under the control of RCT-8 forces. Having established a
process for selection, the Police Partnership Program eventually was
able to train and certify 1,200 police officers for Fallujah. It took most
of the year to accomplish, but they were able to do so because Marines
held the ground.
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Elsewhere in Anbar the results were very poor, especially in
Ramadi and cities west of it. As a result, the Police Partnership
Program could not come even close to recruiting the number of men
needed in Anbar. It was another setback for II MEF.
F. Opportunity
In the spring and summer of 2005, signs began to surface
indicating that the insurgent alliance in Anbar was fragmenting.
Sheikhs were starting to oppose AQI. The collaboration among the
insurgent factions that existed in 2004 was beginning to come apart.
Blunders by Zarqawi and his foreign fighters were fostering a backlash,
providing opportunities for the Marines of II MEF to exploit.
This first presented itself in AO Denver, where the Albu Mahal
tribe in Al Qa’im was at odds with AQI. Several factors contributed to
this fissure. First was AQI’s demand for half of the tribe’s smuggling
profits. That was too much. Business was business, but this was
extortion. Likewise, the tribe rejected AQI’s goal of establishing a rigid
Salafi-style social system similar to what had existed in Afghanistan
under Taliban rule. The sheikhs had no desire to live under such a
puritanical order. The way AQI fought was also unacceptable to them.
Sure, they were killing Marines, but many Ablu Mahal died as well in
the indiscriminate suicide attacks that Zarqawi’s fighters employed.
When the sheikhs implored AQI to desist in these matters, they became
targets themselves.
These developments drove the Albu Mahal to RCT-2 and
during the fall months, they began cooperating against AQI. The
sheikhs formed an independent militia group called the Desert
Protectors to patrol the Syrian border with Marines. Those local tribal
fighters provided border security and acted as scouts for Marine forces.
The stricture against such cooperation was no longer the modus
operandi in AO Denver.
It was an opportunity Washington had missed earlier. But in
the fall of 2005, pragmatism was replacing ill-conceived restrictions
laid down by the CPA in 2003. The tribes were no longer part of the
past. And if the Desert Protectors did not want to deploy out of the Al
Qa’im region because they would not be able to protect their tribal
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members, well, that was okay, too. There were plenty of AQI fighters
coming across the border to keep them occupied.
Al Qa’im was an important turning point, but it was not the
only one. In Ramadi, AQI’s center of gravity, the Albu Fahd, one of the
most important tribes of the Dulaymi confederation in AO Raleigh, was
likewise changing sides. Then, groundbreaking meetings took place in
November and December in Ramadi to explore the basis for
engagement and partnership. Here were the origins of the tribal
engagement dimension of the strategy that I MEF initiated in 2006. As
will be elaborated below, that three-dimensional strategy of the “clear,
hold, build” phases of counterinsurgency, tribal engagement to solidify
local security, and counterterrorism operations to attack the insurgent’s
secret underground network was the basis for Marine Corps success in
Anbar.
A key figure facilitating those initial engagement discussions
was the governor of Anbar province, Mamoon Sami Rashid al-Alwani.
In 2005, he began advocating for dialogue between the sheikhs and the
II MEF. The first development that made this possible was his
interaction with the 2nd Marine Division’s assistant division
commander, Brig. Gen. James Williams. The two men developed a
close working relationship. Next, Mamoon was able to enlist the
support of prominent sheikhs. They saw engagement with the coalition
as a way out from under AQI. One of those sheikhs was Albu Fahad
leader Nasser al-Mukhlif, who became a key figure in the NovemberDecember conferences hosted by Mamoon and Williams.
Those meetings were the beginning of an engagement process
that would culminate by the summer of 2007 in the strategic defeat of
AQI in Anbar. The focus was on what kind of local security forces to
establish in Anbar and what their relationship would be to the coalition.
The key element in those initial discussions—the police—would come
to serve as the foundation for holding the ground in the province in
2006–2007.
That II MEF embraced this opportunity was another critical
learning juncture in 2005. As the year ended, Anbar was in the throes
of a transition, although many in Washington were not aware of it or
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the implications it could have for AQI’s hold on the province. They
viewed Anbar through the lens of escalating violence, and their
perceptions were colored by the brutal fighting the Marines had
engaged in during the year. But in the midst of that fight, II MEF found
a way forward to be able to clear and hold in Anbar through
engagement and partnership. The sheikhs that took part in the
November-December talks brokered by Governor Mamoon had an
alternative in mind—grassroots Sunni security forces drawn from the
tribes of the Dulaymi confederation. This was an opportunity-inwaiting that I MEF would exploit in 2006.

Discussion Questions
1. What role, if any, did the US military’s lack of understanding
about the local culture and local dynamics play in the rise of
the insurgency?
2. How quickly and with what results did the USMC overcome
these initial gaps?
3. What were the key factors in overcoming these initial results?
4. How can the information learned by current forces in the field
be transferred early enough to the relief unit, prior to their
deployment?
5. At what level should this transfer take place?
6. How can small unit-level innovations, learning, and adaptation
be captured and disseminated to other units?
7. To what extent are operational tempo and lack of resources
barriers to learning? What are the other barriers? How did the
USMC overcome these in Anbar?
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V. Adapting
Organizations that successfully navigate the learning cycle
capture the lessons from their operational experiences and embed them
into the organization’s memory through various processes or routines.
Routines guide behavior and can take the form of rules, procedures, and
strategies around which organizations are constructed and through
which they operate.
In the case of the Marine Corps, those routines include a set of
procedures wherein one operational unit, in this case a MEF, relieves
another one. Those procedures entail mechanisms by which the
replacement unit embraces and incorporates the experiences and
knowledge gained from the deployment of the unit it is relieving.
Through that interaction, it then adjusts its campaign plan in ways
designed to correct gaps in the performance of its predecessor, in order
to maximize success during its upcoming deployment. These
procedures shaped the relief in place (RIP) process in which I MEF
replaced II MEF in the early 2006.
A. Surging Violence and Grim Prognoses
As I MEF prepared to deploy back to Anbar for its second
round, a SITREP for the province would have followed the
conventional wisdom at the time: surging violence and grim prognoses.
Enemy violence was skyrocketing, while almost every prediction for
U.S. success in Anbar was spiraling downward.
At the epicenter of this deteriorating state of affairs was
Ramadi, Anbar’s capital. By 2006, it had assumed the moniker of “the
most dangerous city in Iraq.” Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had taken charge
of it. Having been driven from its Fallujah stronghold in late 2004 by
Operation Al Fajr, AQI relocated to Ramadi. By 2006 it had taken over
the city and declared it the capital of its new Islamic caliphate. The
only ground MEF forces held there was the Government Center, and it
was often under enemy attack.
Ramadi was not the only place AQI redeployed. Five other
major towns up the Euphrates corridor—Hit, Haditha, Anah, Rawah,
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and Al Qa’im—likewise had a robust AQI presence. Each “witnessed
heavy clashes resulting in the death of hundreds of local citizens and
the destruction of thousands of shops, schools, houses and government
buildings.” At least that’s what the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs reported on IRIN, its humanitarian news service.
Anbar “has witnessed more fighting and killing than any of Iraq's 18
provinces.”91
Those who collect statistics added further confirmation of the
gloomy state of affairs awaiting I MEF. January 2006 saw
approximately 2,000 insurgent attacks across Iraq’s 18 provinces. By
October, that number was well over 5,000.92 Anbar, one of those 18
provinces, accounted for nearly 1,500 of those acts of violence. This
was higher than in Baghdad, which, in terms of population, is five to
six times bigger.93
B. AQI’s Targeted Killing
When tribal sheikhs began negotiating with the MEF
leadership in late 2005 and 2006, it greatly worried AQI, which saw
this as a survival threat. If the police came to be filled with local
tribesmen sent by their sheikhs, AQI operatives would no longer be
able to “hide in plain sight.” The local population knew who they were,
and if they started feeding that information to the police and U.S.
military, AQI would find itself out of business in Ramadi.
One of the most important sheikhs involved in those 2005
deliberations was Nasser Abd al-Karim Mukhlif al-Fahdawi of the
Albu Fahad tribe. In early 2006, he organized a majlis (meeting) with
Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari and U.S. Ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad in Baghdad. Jafari was not keen on the idea of recruiting
Sunni tribesmen into local police forces that Baghdad did not control.
But Khalilzad had a different view of Sunni tribal engagement: it was
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an opportunity, if managed properly. He convinced Jafari to agree they
could be recruited to help I MEF drive al Qaeda out of Anbar. Nasser
said the sheikhs would provide the recruits.
The very next day, Sheikh Nasser and his brother were gunned
down. This was the start of a fierce counterattack to stop tribal
engagement. Within weeks, several other sheikhs were assassinated. Al
Qaeda intended to use terror to keep an iron grip on the province. The
violence unleashed by Zarqawi was ferocious. Consequently,
cooperation between the sheikhs and I MEF declined precipitously.
Terror was working. It was going to take a proactive engagement effort
by I MEF to break AQI’s vise grip. But as we shall see, that
engagement course of action was not a standalone undertaking, as some
analysts have argued.94 Rather, it was an integral part of a threedimensional strategy that consisted of the counterinsurgency phases of
“clear, hold, build,” tribal engagement to expand the operating force
available to the MEFs to ensure local security, and targeted
counterterrorism aimed at degrading al Qaeda’s clandestine apparatus.
C. I MEF’s Operational Plan
Maj. Gen. Richard Zilmer, the I MEF commander, intended to
take a “different approach to the counterinsurgency fight in Anbar.”95
What that meant, said his deputy, Brig. Gen. Robert Neller, was
focusing on population control and population security: “This fight is
for population control, and we want to have control so that we can
provide security for the population … [We intended to] keep the
insurgents out, keep the good people in, and be able to provide them
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with a secure environment so that they're confident in the security
forces, and [will] tell us when the bad guys move in on them.”96
I MEF built its campaign plan around “clear, hold, build.” And
it intended to implement it methodically, using the oil spot approach,
one of those classic COIN tenets from the 1950s and 1960s. In this
approach, the counterinsurgent forces concentrate on a specific area,
take control of it, secure the population, and then expand that secured
zone outward. It is not a complicated concept, but its implementation is
another matter. How I MEF intended to do so was spelled out in its
operational plan (OPLAN) for 2006.97 And that plan drew heavily on
what I MEF had learned from II MEF’s experiences.
A key element in the OPLAN called for I MEF to expand
Anbar’s police. The goal, recalled Zilmer, was “to make as many police
as we could possibly make, to train them properly … and to increase
the size and the capability of the Iraqi Army.” 98 He believed that a key
driver for counterinsurgency success would come through expansion of
the local police.
As noted earlier, II MEF had tried this in 2005, but was only
able to recruit a handful of men. Recruiting Anbari citizens into the
ranks of local police had been an exercise in futility. Zilmer, Neller,
and their planning staff knew they had to make adjustments.
One of those adjustments assumed that to successfully recruit
local police, it was necessary to clear and hold the area they were
expected to supervise. Once done, those local police could then be
protected from major insurgent counterattacks. This provided them
with the security they need to carry out local policing. I MEF’s
planning staff understood the logic of this basic COIN sequence. They
had to demonstrate that they would not leave the local police out there
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on their own, an important commitment the sheikhs had to have faith
in.
To make that point, I MEF picked Anbar’s most dangerous
city—Ramadi—-as the place to lay down its marker. Zilmer tasked his
planning team to “put together a … very detailed plan to secure the
provincial capital.” That design called for securing parts of the city
before seeking to engage the sheikhs and their tribesmen in the COIN
process. According to one of the planning officers, this was because the
sheikhs were hunkered down in the face of AQI’s murder and
intimidation campaign.99
Zilmer’s planning team surveyed the city with overhead
imagery to determine where to put each check point, each police station
and, most importantly, each combat outpost (COP) that would station I
MEF forces in Ramadi on a 24/7 basis. That is how they would start to
secure the ground in the city and from there spread outward. “We had a
… very methodical plan,” summed up the planning officer, “to build oil
spot zones of security and build out from there.”100
This was the starting point, and it had to precede tribal
engagement. Take the ground, and demonstrate to the sheikhs that you
intended to stay on it. That was the signal they were looking for. The
sheikhs would work against AQI, as some of them had already
demonstrated. But they needed to believe I MEF would secure their
flanks and cover their backs. According to Neller: “There is much talk
about ‘clear, hold, and build’ as a methodology for COIN operations.
You cannot perform these tasks if you don’t stay in an area and
establish a presence and, more importantly, a relationship with the
people.”101
This was the foundation of the OPLAN that I MEF’s planning
staff devised in early 2006: to establish and maintain presence among
the people of Anbar, be they in Ramadi, or in other cities and towns
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running along the Euphrates up to Al Qa’im. Do that and the door to
tribal engagement with the sheikhs will open.
And if those sheikhs gave the signal, men from their tribal
militias could easily fill the ranks of the local police. Reviving the
police required “a strong buy-in from the tribal sheikhs,” explained
Zilmer. “The most important social custom … for the Anbar people is
that tribal-sheikh relationship. … We had to learn that.”102
Effectively engaging the sheikhs also meant learning,
accepting, and, as much as possible, embracing the code of values and
beliefs that guide their behavior and the ways they do things. “We
recognized that dealing in a counterinsurgency in the Middle East or in
the Arab world requires a fundamental understanding of their culture
… We spent a lot of effort to get our Marines sensitive to that,” said
Gen. Zilmer. There is “a certain style and methodology that is unique to
their culture, and we ignore that at our own peril, and we set ourselves
up for frustration.” I MEF had to get the fact that they were “walking
into a new culture” with a different set of norms that they had to adapt
to.103
All of that made sense—in theory. But carrying out tribal
engagement on the ground in Anbar tested the extent to which I MEF
could adapt. Consider the experience of Lt. Col. Scott Shuster, the CO
of Marine Combat Battalion 3/4 in AO Denver.
In discussing how tribal engagement necessitated becoming
“comfortable with cultural norms,” the battalion commander pulled out
a photograph of himself “walking down the street [in Al Qa’im]
holding hands with the mayor. Here in Iraq,” he said, “in this culture,
walking hand in hand down the street says we are friends, we trust each
other, I will do things for him, he will do things for me, this is my
brother. It is a sign of respect and it is a sign of acceptance.” Now that’s
adaptation. Lt. Col. Shuster quickly added, “I wouldn’t do that in the
United States.”104
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D. Topeka, Denver, Raleigh
In each of Anbar’s areas of operations—Topeka, Denver,
Raleigh—I MEF’s campaign plan was put into practice in 2006. The
results are briefly highlighted below.
In 2006 AO Topeka was assigned to the 1st Brigade Combat
Team, 1st Armored Division—the “Ready First”—commanded by Col.
Sean MacFarland. The unit deployed to Anbar in May from Tal Afar.
That earlier deployment was important for the Ready First. In Tal Afar,
it was introduced to the counterinsurgency operations successfully
executed in 2005 by the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment commanded
by Col. H. R. McMaster. However, in Ramadi the Ready First was not
falling in behind a COIN operation that was well underway.
Ramadi was very different. “It was a pretty dire situation,”
recalled MacFarland. “Ramadi was essentially under enemy control.”
AQI “had freedom of movement throughout most of the city … If we
tried to get close to the center of the city … we would come into heavy
contact … al Qaeda dominated the city … Zarqawi was known to be
out there.” And he had plenty of fighters with him. 105
Upon arriving in the AO, Col. MacFarland was told by I
MEF’s Gen. Zilmer to “fix Ramadi but don’t do a Fallujah.”106 That
meant taking a COIN approach. MacFarland was ready for that, having
conducted COIN up in Tal Afar. And Zilmer had embedded COIN in
his OPLAN for the theater. It was just the right confluence of thinking
and planning, recalled MacFarland.107 He intended to use Ready First
units to clear and hold Ramadi. And Zilmer assigned Marine Battalion
1/6 to give MacFarland extra boots on the ground.
Step one was the “isolation of the city.” The days of AQI
moving in and out at will had to end. Next, MacFarland intended to
establish combat outposts in Ramadi “to take the city and its environs
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back [from AQI] one neighborhood at a time.” And once a COP owned
a piece of ground in the capital, they would engage the local sheikhs,
convincing them “we intend to stay.” And then they would encourage
the sheikhs to partner up and send their tribesmen to join the local
police force in “the secured neighborhood.”108 Here we see the
symbiotic relationship between the counterinsurgency phases of “clear
and hold” and tribal engagement’s role in expanding the available
operating forces to ensure local security continuity.
This was the beginning. It set in motion the spreading of the oil
spot across Ramadi. In neighborhood after neighborhood, the soldiers
and Marines under MacFarland’s command took control. And because
AQI could not be sure where the next COP would spring up, said the
colonel, “We found out pretty quickly that we were able to get in and
set up … overnight and the enemy usually took about 48 hours to
respond.” The brigade “had to dedicate a fair amount of combat power
to securing each COP and protecting the lines of communications
[LOC]” between the COPs because “we knew AQI would try to come
back in behind us and reseed our LOCs with IEDs.”109
In effect, MacFarland’s men were beginning to network
Ramadi with combat outposts that established “mutually supporting
and interlocking fields of fire and observation along those LOCs [that
linked them together]. That was … the process.”110 And playing a key
role in that campaign in central Ramadi—ground zero in the fight to
oust al Qaeda—was the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, under the command
of Lt. Col. William Jurney.
This was the sign the sheikhs wanted to see. But combat
outposts were only one side of COIN. The other side was to establish
Iraqi police substations at or near the COPs. To do this, Iraqi police
were needed, and in large numbers. To fill those police ranks, the
sheikhs began sending their tribesmen to help spread the oil spot.
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As these developments unfolded during the fall months of
2006, al Qaeda understood what they signaled for the fate of its
caliphate. It escalated the violence, increasing the number of daily
attacks. But the combination of tribal engagement and combat outposts
proved toxic to AQI’s efforts to dominate Ramadi.”111 The soldiers and
Marines under Col. MacFarland’s command were taking hold of
Ramadi, with the help of rapidly growing numbers of police. They had
initiated a process that their replacements in 2007 would complete.
In AO Denver, RCT-7 arrived on the heels of Operation Steel
Curtain, a successful 2,000 Marine sweep to dislodge insurgents from
Hit, Haditha, Hussaybah, and Al Qa’im. Col. William Crowe planned
to build on Steel Curtain by “spreading that oil spot.”112 Specifically, he
intended to take RCT-2’s success in holding Al Qa’im and emulate it.
Having swept AQI out, RCT-2 left “one American battalion” in place
to hold. That told the sheikhs they could count on RCT-2. Crowe
intended to reinforce that message throughout the AO.
Having a lock on Al Qa’im, the RCT-7 chief applied the same
approach to the towns along the Euphrates corridor, including Rawah,
Anah, Haditha, Baghdadi, and Hit. For each, it was the same COIN
method implemented in town after town down to the Ramadi outskirts.
That is what Col. Crowe meant by “spreading that oil spot.”
Finally, responsibility for AO Raleigh in the spring of 2006
was assigned to RCT-5, commanded by Col. Lawrence Nicholson. The
model that he seized upon for the AO was the successful COIN
program in Fallujah. It was an outstanding illustration of “clear, hold,
build.” Col. Nicholson explained: “We’ve had significant success in the
Fallujah AO … When we took over from RCT-8 the seeds were
already there … we inherited a better situation. We had more [local]
security forces in this part of Al Anbar.” The city had a robust Iraqi
police force, and they helped make Fallujah, in the colonel’s
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estimation, “without peer in terms of security” in any of Iraq’s cities.113
And that security and stability, empowered by engagement, opened the
door for political progress and economic recovery. Fallujah had a
functioning city council and thorough engagement efforts were under
way to rebuild infrastructure and jumpstart business.
Nicholson thought that if it worked in Fallujah, spread it
elsewhere in AO Raleigh to provide stability and security to the rest of
the population. It was basic counterinsurgency principles. “You must
go back to the people. You must engage the people. ... Look,” he
exclaimed in a 2010 reflection on what RCT-5 achieved, “It’s the
people, stupid.”114
Key to RCT-5’s success was the growth of the Iraqi security
forces. “We have almost doubled our battle space in terms of
geography … We now go all the way to damn near to Ramadi,” said
Col. Nicholson in March 2007. “We’ve been able to do that because
we’ve turned over a lot of existing battle space to Iraqis … I have three
Iraqi brigades, all of which are now independent brigades … I’m
incredibly pleased with our Iraqi police work … I don’t know of
anybody who has had the kind of success we have had with the
police.”115 As a result of these developments, RCT-5’s mission was
evolving by the end of its deployment, with non-kinetic activities on
the increase.
E. The Awakening: A Force Multiplier
These developments in Denver, Topeka, and Raleigh could not
have taken place without tribal engagement. The sheikhs had to send
men to the police for I MEF to gain the manpower needed to “hold” the
ground across Anbar.
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But getting them to do so in the aftermath of AQI’s ferocious
murder and intimidation campaign was not easy. That is why I MEF’s
plan called for RCT-7, RCT-5, and the Ready First to demonstrate that
they would not leave once they cleared an area, which was an important
assurance that the sheikhs had to trust in. As was noted earlier, the
counterinsurgency phases of “clear, hold, build” were symbiotically
interrelated with tribal engagement in Anbar, and they were
implemented in conjunction with one another.
Well aware of the consequences of the sheikhs aligning against
it, al Qaeda gave no quarter into the summer months. Then it went too
far in August when it murdered Sheikh Abu Ali Jassim, who had been
encouraging members of his tribesmen to join the police and resist
AQI. After killing him, his assassins hid the sheikh’s body rather than
returning it for a proper burial. This violated Islamic law and inflamed
not only Sheikh Jassim’s fellow tribesmen, but many other sheiks from
across Al Anbar.
In conjunction with the signals being sent through the
operations of RCT-7, RCT-5, and the Ready First a critical turning
point had been reached. The situation was ripe for engagement, a fact
that several sheikhs came to embrace, most importantly Sheikh Abdul
Sittar albu-Risha. His father had been murdered by AQI, as were two of
his brothers, all for opposing AQI’s imposition of its interpretation of
Sharia law.
Sheikh Ahmed, Sittar’s brother and the paramount sheikh of
the Albu Risha tribe, recalled in a 2009 interview how those days
unfolded: “We realized that the people had had it with the [al Qaeda]
situation … So Sheik Sittar and I, we … got in touch with the tribal
sheikhs and their cousins … to fight al-Qaeda.” Sittar told his brother,
“Leave it to me. I’ll take care of it.” And he began “talking with the
tribal sheiks, one by one … He gathered them for a conference on the
14th of September, 2006.”116
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At that meeting, an important segment of Anbar’s leading tribal
sheiks agreed to align with I MEF to fight AQI. The main room of
Sattar’s house, recalled Col. MacFarland, was filled with sheikhs and
“all kinds of other guys lining the walls.” Sheikh Sittar came to the
doorway to greet the brigade commander and brought him “up to sit
down with him at the head chair at the head of the room … to explain
that they wanted to form this Awakening movement.”117
The central importance of tribal engagement in
counterinsurgency operations was well understood by Gen. Zilmer and
the I MEF staff. They embedded it in their operational plan for Anbar.
So, when Sittar and over 50 leading sheikhs and other important
political figures met on September 14 to get the Anbar Awakening
Council off the ground, I MEF was leaning forward to work with them.
It was in the OPLAN, which had been structured to facilitate
engagement by staying in place. All the pieces were coming together
for a reversal of fortune in Anbar.
F. The Tipping Point
By December, the situation across Anbar was tipping in favor
of I MEF and against AQI. If II MEF had learned in 2005, I MEF
utilized those lessons to adapt in 2006. Its COIN-based operational plan
with the interrelated elements of clearing out insurgents, holding
territory through combat outposts, engaging and aligning with the
sheikhs, and building local Iraqi police units drawn from those tribes
had shifted the ground in Anbar. And when fused with what Ali Hatim
Abd al-Razzaq Ali al-Sulayman, the paramount sheikh of the Dulaym
confederation, called “the Awakening Revolution,” the conditions were
set to bring the insurgency that AQI had commandeered in 2005 to heel
in 2007.118
Several accounts have characterized the Sunni Awakening as a
sudden “flipping” of the sheikhs from one side to the other, and a
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standalone process. But what this study found was just the opposite.
The Awakening was a process that began at the end of 2005 and in
2006 passed through two phases. The first was the ill-fated effort in the
early winter months that was snuffed out by AQI. The second came in
the summer. It took root because of the successful execution of I
MEF’s operational plan, in particular the linking of tribal engagement
with the methodical establishment of combat outposts in the population
centers of Anbar. In Topeka, Raleigh, and Denver the forces of I MEF
spread the oil spot, securing more and more ground.
The events of 2006 reveal that holding territory is essential in
this kind of war. It is the foundation for a successful counterinsurgency
strategy. You must be able to secure the ground where the population
lives. I MEF’s COIN-based operational plan cleared the insurgents out
of the populated areas and then secured that territory through combat
outposts. In doing this, it demonstrated to the people of Anbar that
engagement was for real.
Territory is as important in counterinsurgency as it is in
conventional operations, but for different reasons. In COIN, taking
territory constrains the enemy’s freedom of movement and gives the
population a safe space to live and work. Once the sheikhs were
convinced that I MEF intended to stay the course in Anbar, they opened
the door to the support of the population. And that population, in turn,
swelled the ranks of the Anbar security forces and delivered a wealth of
local intelligence on the whereabouts of the AQI network in the
province.
Finally, 2006 demonstrated that the tipping point in
counterinsurgency is not always self-evident. The year had been an
increasingly violent one in Anbar, as the statistics demonstrate.
Understanding what that escalating violence signaled proved extremely
tricky. Some assessments declaring Anbar lost were far off the mark. In
2007, II MEF replaced I MEF. They saw the situation quite differently.
It offered opportunity, and they intended to capitalize on the tipping
point that had been reached in 2006. II MEF planned to “cash in,”
consolidating the gains made by I MEF.
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Discussion Questions
1. What effect does a stable, settled population have on
developing COIN oil spots?
2. What are the barriers to developing a “permanent force” in an
area with a strong history of invasion and conflict? What are
the risks and rewards of this strategy?
3. Can “clear, hold, build” work in already unstable regions? If
so, how? What adaptations are needed, and what are the risks
and rewards?
4. This case study presents the USMC perspective on a bigger
story, which leads to a larger set of questions. The most
controversial of these is: What explains the success in Anbar?
Some of the issues that should be discussed include:
5. Was the tipping point in Anbar initiated by the tribal
Awakening Movement, the Marines, or something else?
6. What was the role of Task Force 145 (see Section VI) and their
targeted killing of al-Qaeda operatives in Anbar?
7. What was the role of individuals in taking advantage of
changing dynamics? Was there a single tipping point, or did
several events set the conditions for success?
8. What does this discussion on success teach us about other
insurgencies?
9. As outsiders in a culture, can we recognize and exploit the
tipping point before the insurgency does? If not, how can we
use local knowledge to improve our chances of success?
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VI. Consolidating
In late 2006, II MEF prepared to return to an Anbar province
that was in the throes of change. Its leadership understood the gains I
MEF had made in 2006, and they intended to piggyback on their
strategy to exploit those gains and reach the crossover point, the
transition from the kinetic fight to the post-conflict phase of
counterinsurgency. But it was hard to plan for when to do this and how
long it would take.
Maj. Gen. Walt Gaskin, the commanding general of II MEF
(Forward), did not have his command prepare a new campaign plan for
2007. I MEF “had [established] a tremendous foundation” to build on,
he explained. “I took his [Gen. Zilmer’s] campaign plan and I
developed it.”119 This included “the tribal engagement part.” That was
essential if II MEF was going to “in a COIN sense—counterinsurgency
sense—separate Al Qaida … from the population centers.”120
Tribal engagement was the key for building on what I MEF had
accomplished. Consequently, that necessitated a keen understanding of
the tribes of Anbar. In II MEF’s “workup” for Anbar, then-Brig. Gen.
John Allen was tasked by Gen. Gaskin with “putting together a PME
[professional military education] program on tribal engagement, the
history of Mesopotamia and Iraq into modern times and, in particular,
about what we termed the human terrain in Anbar Province.”121
As part of this organizational learning, II MEF brought to
Camp Lejeune numerous specialists on these matters with much
experience on the ground in the Arab world and with tribal societies.
All of this was geared to prepare Marines to be able to work “inside the
tribes,” to “penetrate the tribal membrane,” said Allen.122 And that was
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true not only for officers at the rank of Generals Gaskin and Allen, but
also for those junior officers and NCOs of the MEF’s companies and
platoons. In fact, it was especially critical for the latter because
counterinsurgency fights are won or lost by those small units. All of
them, said General Allen, had to have an “understanding of tribalism,
understanding of the personalities that we were going to face and the
whole dynamic of the code of conduct associated with being a member
of an Arab tribe … [if] we were going to fully grasp the opportunities
in front of us.”123 Tribal engagement had to be facilitated and nurtured.
Tribal engagement was not a “happening,” but a methodical process
that required careful tending to bring to fruition.
A. Line of Attack
II MEFs lines of operations were subdivided between its
Ground Force Element (GFE) and Combat Service Support Element
(CSSE). The former was commanded by Brig. Gen. Mark Gurganus,
while Brig. Gen. Allen was assigned responsibility for the latter.
Gurganus had responsibility for the kinetic fight. To execute it,
he deployed two Marine regiments to AO Denver and Raleigh and an
Army brigade to AO Topeka. With those forces, he intended to
establish security and stability from one end of Anbar to the other. He
also had responsibility for training the Iraqi security forces, expanding
their ranks to be able hold the ground once it was cleared of insurgents.
As commander of the Combat Service Support Element, Gen. Allen
had responsibility for an array of non-kinetic missions that included
governance, economic development and rule of law.
Moreover, Allen had responsibility for “tribal engagement,”
which he described as “the critical enabler within and around all the
Lines of Operation.”124 Neither Gurganus nor Allen could successfully
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prosecute their lines of operations without it. Tribal engagement was
the key to everything II MEF hoped to achieve in 2007. 125
While II MEF did plan and execute across these kinetic and
non-kinetic lines of operations, and while it is the case that they were in
mutual support of each other, they did have to be implemented
sequentially. For the non-kinetic lines of operations to have the desired
effect, it was first necessary to use firepower and maneuvers to attack
enemy strongholds, drive them out, and then hold that ground after it
was cleared. This was the kinetic part of counterinsurgency operations,
and it established the security that set the table for the non-kinetic
LOOs. This was the line of attack taken by II MEF in 2007.
B. Consolidating Security in Topeka, Raleigh, and Denver
When II MEF deployed to Anbar, plenty of violence awaited it.
The weekly average number of attacks for the province in January was
400.126 Each of Anbar’s AO’s still teemed with AQI fighters, and Gen.
Gurganus, in conjunction with his three battlespace regimental and
brigade commanders, focused on driving them out and then securing
that ground. What follows is a brief recounting of those operations.
AO Topeka: Ramadi
When Col. John Charlton took the 1st Brigade Combat Team
(BCT) of the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division to AO Topeka in February
2007, he knew the numbers. The BCT he was replacing had been there
“eight months and lost 80 Soldiers and Marines,” he recalled. “We
were going to be there for at least a year and we found out later that it
was going to extend to 15 months. So, I knew that there was no way we
could sustain that [casualty rate] … we had to do something dramatic
… otherwise we would die from 1,000 cuts.”127
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The colonel decided to clear AQI out of Ramadi en masse and
take control of the city. The Ready First had made a “penetration, they
had established a foothold” in Ramadi, noted Charlton. “The next
logical step was to pour everything in there because we had the
conditions set to do that. We had a nascent relationship now with the
tribal leaders and that led to their greater support for the ISF. So, from a
tactical standpoint, we were postured well.”128
Col. Charlton planned a six-week campaign consisting of
several operations to take hold of different parts of Ramadi. The first of
these took place in the southeastern part of the city, known locally as
the Ma’laab District. The techniques used here were repeated in
subsequent operations. They mirrored, said the colonel, “the “clear,
hold, build paradigm … You have to do a physical separation of the
population from the enemy and you do that through clearing … going
house to house, street by street, and clearing the enemy out.”129
Having cleared, it was time to hold the Ma’laab, to secure that
separation of the population from AQI. To do so, Charlton’s men
started establishing COPs. The first combat outpost was set up in 48
hours. He described the process as a “COP in a box, a pre-fabricated
fighting position made out of steel and ballistic glass. We had trucks
that were all packaged with these things and once we seized a building,
we could have a fully functional combat outpost within about 48 hours.
We had engineers standing by to go in there and establish power and
wire the place up so you had lights and generators and radios.”130
And once the COP had secured the area, its forces began
interacting with the local population to gain their support. They did so
by providing humanitarian assistance, including blankets, generators,
food and potable water, and medical support. They even distributed
damage payments to begin the rebuilding process. The end result was
that in three weeks the operation eliminated insurgent safe havens,
established security in the Ma’laab, empowered the Iraqi Police and
local government legitimacy, and established public works projects.
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The 1st BCT repeated this elsewhere in Ramadi with the same
results. By March 30, the city was cleared. On that day Charlton
surveyed it from end to end and found it “quiet.” It was, he exclaimed,
“unbelievable … There was not one single attack in my entire AO, to
include downtown Ramadi.”131 AQI had lost Ramadi in just six weeks.
Charlton’s men established 40 platoon- and company-sized joint
security stations, combat outposts, and checkpoints throughout the city.
And by the summer, he said, “You could safely go virtually anywhere
in the city.”132
AO Raleigh: Fallujah
The situation in AO Raleigh when RCT-7 commander Col.
Richard Simcock arrived was slipping backward, however. His mission
was to tackle the dogged insurgent attacks taking place in his AO,
starting with parts of Fallujah. Simcock intended to employ the same
tactics being used in Ramadi by Lt. Col. Bill Jurney, whose Marine
battalion was sweeping insurgents out of the city one block at a time,
establishing the conditions for “COPs in a box.”
In Fallujah, Simcock’s 2/6 battalion did the same thing. By the
end of the spring, neighborhoods that 2/6 Marines had been unable to
enter without getting into a gunfight in the winter months were now
quiet. Other parts of AO Raleigh also had some real hot spots that the
battalions of RCT-7 had to pacify. They followed the same blueprint,
connecting the clear-hold-build dots. In other words, where AQI once
roamed freely and with impunity, the Marines forces established a
permanent and persistent presence there. And once the local population
felt secure, they established a neighborhood watch and the tips on AQI
whereabouts rolled in.
By June major kinetic operations were over in AO Raleigh,
said the executive officer (XO) of RCT-7. They were “largely done.”
The mission was now to transfer control to Iraqi security forces,
training their police and army to assume control. And that took time, he
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added.133 But RCT-7 could only get to that point by clearing, holding,
and establishing permanent presence. It was a point that Col. Simcock
underscored. Through “permanent presence the people know that
you’re there to stay, you build those relationships, they start talking to
you, and it just all rolls in your favor.”134
AO Denver
Finally, in AO Denver, RCT-2 initiated a series of operations
to consolidate the security gains made there in 2006 to move into the
non-kinetic stages of counterinsurgency. By the fall of 2007 these
security consolidating operations, particularly in the Al Qa’im area,
made possible the handoff of multiple RCT-2 fixed positions to ISF,
increasing ISF’s responsibility and visibility with the populace.
C. Counterterrorism Operations
Implementing counterinsurgency was II MEF’s main effort in
Anbar. As illustrated above, this entailed taking control of the ground
in the province by spreading that COIN oil spot, and then consolidating
those gains through tribal engagement. But there was a natural
complement to those counterinsurgency and tribal engagement
operations, the counterterrorist program carried out by the special
mission units of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).
While COIN and tribal engagement isolated the population
from AQI and established local protection and security, they did not
eliminate AQI’s secret apparatus. Those surreptitious capabilities
provided AQI with a broad assortment of means to conduct irregular
warfare in Anbar and elsewhere in Iraq. That highly clandestine
network, which was composed of a complex array of operational,
command, and support units, was generally beyond the reach of MEF
forces and their tribal counterparts.135
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To disrupt and degrade AQI’s secret infrastructure in Anbar,
the U.S. employed a clandestine organization—Task Force 145—that
likewise operated in the shadows and consisted of highly trained
special mission units. Their forte was offensive and highly lethal
counterterrorism measures directly targeted at the enemy’s clandestine
apparatus. This was the third dimension of strategy implemented by the
Marines in Anbar beginning in 2006.
In Iraq, that high-speed outfit was put together by Lt. Gen. Stan
McChrystal, who had spent a good part of his Army career in the
special mission units of JSOC. He commanded JSOC and deployed
with units to Iraq from September 2003 until June 2008. Once there, he
built a special task force made up of the Army’s Delta Force, Navy
SEAL Team 6, the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation
Regiment, elements of the the 75th Ranger Regiment, and the 24th
Special Tactics Squadron of the Air Force. Additionally, men from the
Britain Special Air Service (SAS) were part of this team, which came
to be known as Task Force 145.
In Iraq, Task Force 145 was located at Balad, a Saddam-era
airbase 68 kilometers north of Baghdad. McChrystal had it up and
running by June 2004. In putting it together, McChrystal started with
the premise that he needed a networked organization to defeat the al
Qaeda network in Iraq. This was because terrorist groups like AQ had
shifted from formally organized hierarchical systems to flexible,
decentralized network structures of loosely connected individuals and
subgroups that operated with considerable tactical independence. The
Balad facility included a state-of-the-art joint operations center (JOC),
whose daily activities were directed by the commander of Delta Force.
Task Force 145 was subdivided into geographically targeted units: Task
Force West was assigned to the greater Anbar area; the Baghdad area
was assigned to Task Force Central; Task Force North focused on the
Kurdish region; the SAS men of Task Force Black were in the south of
Iraq.
the-waterline operational, command, and support units comes from Roy
Godson and the work of the National Strategy Information Center. See their
DVD, Adapting the Paradigm, http://www.strategycenter.org/.
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Task Force 145’s operational tempo, set by McChrystal, was to
“hit them every night.” And that resulted in the elimination of a large
number of AQI’s mid-level managers who ran the operational,
command, and support units. How many did they remove? In the covert
world of outfits like Task Force 145, such numbers are hard to come
by. But in his book Task Force Black, the story of the British SAS
element assigned to McChrystal, the well-connected journalist Mark
Urban provides some startling figures. If he is to be believed, 145
became an AQI killing machine. “Between 2005 and early 2007,” he
reports, Task Force 145 “killed two thousand members of the Sunni
jihadist groups as well as detaining many more.” 136
D. Expanding ISF
In addition to the kinetic fight against the insurgents, Gen.
Gurganus had responsibility for training the Iraqi security forces.
Expanding their ranks was essential for holding the ground cleared of
AQI and its local counterparts by his Marine regiments and Army
brigade.
But to accomplish that objective—growing the police and
changing the composition of the army units in the province—tribal
engagement was indispensable. “What I soon discovered,” said Gaskin,
“is that there is a direct correlation between tribal engagement and
recruiting. So that ability to connect the tribes with the cause that both
of us had in common, getting rid of al Qaeda, and connecting them with
their government, meant that they needed to be participants in that, both
from a government standpoint, as well as from the military and police
standpoint.”137
That engagement policy, which was launched at the end of
2005 and expanded during 2006, came to fruition in 2007. The
significant growth of the police and Iraqi Army in Anbar in 2007 is
evidence of it. As the numbers illustrate, the size of Iraqi police in
Anbar grew from approximately 9,000 in December 2006 to roughly
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25,000 a year later. This increase gave II MEF the capacity to dominate
the physical and human terrain of the province.138
E. The Centrality of Engagement
To be successful in Anbar, the Marines had to be able to
engage the tribal leaders of the province on their terms. And that
involved developing a strategy that reflected a sound grasp of Bedouin
tribal traditions, Islamic principles, and Arab cultural values. I MEF in
2006 and II MEF the following year embedded that knowledge in their
shared campaign plan. This was indispensable because engagement is a
strategic tool in an irregular war .
Engagement was the key facilitator to solidifying security.
Gen. Gurganus could not have consolidated the gains of his forces
without it. The sheikhs provided the men to fill out the ranks of the
police and army, which was a prerequisite for holding territory and
denying it to the insurgents. It provided the force multiplier needed to
win the kinetic fight, and it brought that fight to an end much more
quickly than II MEF had anticipated.
Engagement was equally vital in facilitating the initiation of the
post-conflict phase of the war. Each of the non-kinetic lines of
operation was dependent on buy-in from the tribal leadership and their
willingness to take part in the governance process.
Once in Anbar, Gen. Allen moved to expand tribal
engagement. The first thing he did was make it a separate line of
operation within II MEF. It had been part of governance but Allen
realized that, since engagement was going to be central to everything II
MEF hoped to accomplish, it needed to be separated from governance.
This proved to be an astute decision both for the kinetic fight and for
managing the initial phase of the post-conflict period.
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F. Post-Conflict Crossover
According to the counterinsurgency classics, insurgencies can
take considerable time and effort to degrade and neutralize. This is
especially true once the insurgents have embeded their secret, belowthe-waterline operational, command, and support units within the
population. Rooting them out is an arduous and lengthy process.
Insurgencies are protracted struggles—long and drawn-out affairs, not
easily reversed.
Consequently, when II MEF deployed to Anbar in early 2007,
it expected no immediate drop-off in insurgent violence. The situation
it inherited from I MEF was improving but gave little hint that it would
dissipate quickly. No imminent reversal was expected.
But such a turnaround is exactly what transpired, and it
happened abruptly. In the week of January 19, 2007, just as II MEF
was arriving, nearly 450 enemy actions took place in the province. But
four months later, that number had dropped to roughly 150 incidents.
And by the beginning of July, it was less than 100, and stayed there
through mid-September, with a low of just over 50 the first week of
August, and again in early September.
“It was a striking drop-off,” said Gen. Allen. “Within 90 days
of coming over here, virtually the entire situation turned around.”139 It
took II MEF by surprise. However, Allen explained, “While we hadn’t
planned specifically for it [the sharp drop-off in violence], what we did
plan for was to recognize it.”140 What he meant by this was that II
MEF’s intelligence shop was looking for indicators that might signal
change was coming and to capitalize on it. And in March, one of those
indicators appeared. “Sometime around March we had a meeting …
where Sheikh Sattar and the Awakening sheikhs were going to meet
with the governor. They were going to meet with the governor and
begin to talk about … giving the Awakening additional seating on the
provincial council.”141
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At the end of that session, one of II MEF’s liaison officers took
Allen aside and said to him, “I want you to listen to what I’m going to
say because I think this is pretty important.” He then asked the general
if he realized that during the “meeting there was never any conversation
about security or fighting? The entire conversation was about postconflict power sharing and economic development. These guys are
entering their post-conflict period right now,” said the liaison officers.
The intelligence officers for II MEF came to the same conclusion—
“things were profoundly changing.” 142 Then in May came the sharp
drop-off in violence.
The crossover point from the kinetic fight to the post-conflict
phase of COIN came up quickly. The insurgency in Anbar was not
conforming to the COIN classics. Once more, war—in this case
irregular war—proved to be unpredictable. For II MEF, this presented a
strategic opportunity. The forces of Gen. Gurganus had achieved their
missions, and it was now time to consolidate those gains. II MEF had
been organized for this moment, for that crossover from conflict to
post-conflict. Having learned from I MEF and prepared for change,
they were able to capitalize on that opportunity.
G. From Armed Struggle to Political Competition
The transition from kinetic operations to governance,
reconstruction, and rule of law transpired without much warning in the
late spring. To manage that changeover required a broader array of
capabilities than those employed in counterinsurgency’s “clear and
hold” phases. II MEF now confronted the challenges of COIN’s “build”
period. It had prepared to capitalize on these new conditions in Anbar
to jumpstart post-conflict activities and manage the transition
opportunity that appeared in the late spring with the dramatic decline in
enemy violence. It is important to note, however, that its role was a
limited one. II MEF could begin the build process, but seeing the
process through to completion was beyond its responsibility and
capacity.
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It is beyond the scope of this study to go into all the specifics
of the post-conflict activities initiated by II MEF. Suffice it to note that
by the time they turned over command to I MEF in the early spring of
2008, the situation in Anbar had undergone a remarkable
metamorphosis. Consequently, for I MEF the focus in 2008 was on (1)
completing the professionalization of the Iraqi Security Forces and
handing off the security mission to them; (2) advancing those nonkinetic lines of operations that foster reconstruction, economic
development, and the ascendance of the rule of law; (3) turning over
responsibility for advancing the post-conflict agenda to I MEF’s
civilian agency counterparts; and (4) exiting Anbar.
The goal, said Maj. Gen. John Kelly, commander of I MEF,
was to build on what II MEF had accomplished the previous year and
“accelerate the situation toward normalcy.”143 By the end of 2008,
Kelly believed that Anbar had reached that point. Violent actions “were
down to, at the most, eight or nine a week.” And that number “held for
the last five, six months” of the year.”144 Moreover, I MEF continued
the “build” process that II MEF started. But while the Marines could
initiate this phase, once it was underway the civilian agencies had to
develop the means to take control of it and bring it to completion.

Discussion Questions
1. For the oil spot strategy to be successful, a certain level of trust
by the local population is needed. What issues might interfere
with establishing this trust?
2. Transitioning between the clearing and the holding phase can
be fraught with difficulties. One of those is the question of who
should stay once the clearing has taken place.
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3. Is it ideal to use the clearing force as the holding force? If the
clearing phase saw extensive civilian casualties, how might that
affect the locals’ view of the holding force and their support of
the insurgents?
4. What are the alternatives? (See CIWAG case study An
Operator’s Guide to Human Terrain Teams by Norman Nigh.)
5. A second issue is timing and resources: How soon after a
clearing operation should the holding and building begin? Does
speed matter? Why?
6. Defeating an insurgency usually requires a political solution.
Was there a political aspect to the defeat of the insurgency in
Anbar?
7. How would the Marines’ gains have been possible without the
previous counterterrorism operations?
8. Does COIN pose a greater threat to insurgents than
counterterrorism (CT) operations?
9. Under what circumstances might it be important to use one
without the other?
10. What are the risks of carrying out CT operations in the same
area where you plan to carry out COIN operations?
11. Counterinsurgency operations are extremely labor-intensive,
which raises several operational and strategic questions.
12. How does the risk involved, the commitment of soldiers and
resources, and the slow progress that is difficult to quantify, all
create strategic and operational pressures on unit- and
company-level commanders?
13. How can commanders make the most use of their forces and
equipment in a similar operation if restrictions are placed on
people and resources?
14. What is the role of time and timing in COIN operations?
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VII. Reflections and Lessons from the Anbar
Campaign
What the Marine Corps achieved in Anbar constituted a major
turning point in the Iraq War. Many had declared the fight there lost at
the very time I MEF was launching a three-dimensional strategy in
2006 that culminated in 2007 with a strategic defeat for AQI and those
insurgents aligned with it. And that triumph took place before the Surge
and the counterinsurgency strategy upon which it was based.
Like the Surge, the Marine campaign plan for 2006 was based
on counterinsurgency principles, adapted for the Anbar context. And
those precepts were applied across the province before FM 3-24
Counterinsurgency, which served as the strategic basis for the Surge,
was officially released in December 2006. By then, I MEF was on its
way to degrading AQI in Anbar.
In February 2007, Gen. David Petraeus succeeded Gen. George
Casey in Iraq. He intended to use the Surge forces as part of a new
strategy based on FM 3-24. By the time he took command in February
2007, the execution of I MEF’s COIN-based plan, now being advanced
by II MEF, was reaching the crossover point in Anbar. By the late
spring the level of violence fell precipitously, and shortly thereafter II
MEF started the transition to an emphasis on non-kinetic operations.
The fight for Anbar Province demonstrated the Marine Corps’s
capacity to learn and change in order to address complicated and very
violent challenges. The Marine Corps once more proved that it
possessed this aptitude and that they were up to the task.
The four-year fight in the Sunni heartland is an important
illustration of that Marine capacity to improvise and adapt, which is
infused into the Corps training routines and warrior ethos. As discussed
earlier, Marines are taught to be prepared to rise above those
unexpected obstacles always present in combat—what the military
theorist Carl von Clausewitz called the fog of war.
Recall that, as Richard Downie noted, military organizations
that learn and adapt are ones flexible enough to “use new knowledge or
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understanding gained from experience or study to adjust institutional
norms, doctrine and procedures in ways designed to minimize previous
gaps in performance and maximize future successes.”145 An essential
ingredient in that capacity to learn is “institutional memory.” It sustains
“behaviors, mental maps, norms, and values over time.”146
The Corps has an organizational culture that is consistent with
the learning course of action outlined by Downie. That culture embeds
in Marines a method of operating that embraces learning and memory.
Its history is rife with examples of Marines at first being caught in the
fog of war. But then, having learned from knowledge gained in the
fight, the Corps shows itself to be flexible enough to make adjustments,
overcome gaps in performance, and succeed. The Marine Corps has
demonstrated this adroitness at embracing change at various points in
its history.
The campaign in Anbar illustrates these enduring cultural
norms of learning, memory, and adaptability. In 2004, I MEF found
itself in the fog of war. While it prepared for deployment by studying
past experiences in the small wars fought from 1900 through the early
1930s, as well as by examining COIN practices in Vietnam, the
situation in the Sunni heartland was not what they expected.147
I MEF was not ready for the kind of insurgency emerging in
Anbar and, subsequently, suffered ugly surprises. The operational plan
was not able to survive first contact, and considerable time was spent,
to paraphrase Gen. Kelly, trying to figure out whether or not those guys
trying to kill Marines had turned into an insurgency. I MEF lacked
local intelligence necessary to produce a full profile of the enemy.
The situation in Anbar became increasingly violent in 2005 as
al Qaeda made Iraq the main front, the forward edge of the global battle
with the U.S. In doing so, it pulled out all the stops to inflict a defeat of
strategic proportions on America. But at the same time, the Marines
were learning and gaining ground knowledge from that fight.
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That knowledge of the conflict was plowed into the
development of I MEF’s 2006 campaign plan. This study details how I
MEF designed and implemented a counterinsurgency approach that
was contextualized for Anbar, consisting of (1) the COIN phases of
“clear, hold, build”; (2) tribal engagement to expand the operating force
available to maintain local security; and (3) targeted counterterrorism
aimed at degrading al Qaeda’s clandestine apparatus. These three
dimensions of the campaign plan were all critical to the Marine success
in Anbar. That COIN strategy, implemented by I and II MEFs in 2006–
2007, culminated by the end of 2008 in Gen. Kelly’s pronouncement
that it was now “appropriate to use the term victory in Anbar.”148 In
achieving that state of affairs, the Marines were well served by their
organizational culture.
A decade into the twenty-first century reveals that the conflict
in Iraq is not an anachronism. A persistent and prevalent pattern of
irregular conflict has emerged, and the trend is here to stay for the
foreseeable future. The conditions that lead to and foster irregular
conflicts in various parts of the world— conditions found in weak and
failing states—are not easily reversed. Over half the world’s states are
weak, failing, or failed, and are unable to control their territory,
maintain a monopoly over the use of force, or perform core functions.
These situations provide opportunities for armed groups to pursue their
objectives from the local, to the regional, and even to the global level,
often causing major geopolitical damage.
Therefore, the lessons from Anbar are not unique to that fouryear battle, and they are not only for the Marines to study. Given the
persistence of irregular conflict challenges, those lessons will likely
have an enduring applicability in the years ahead for all U.S. military
and civilian security institutions. Therefore, they should be assiduously
examined, dissected, and, where appropriate, institutionalized into
training, organization, and preparation for future irregular challenges.
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Here closing reflections are offered, drawn from the narrative. They are
presented as ten informed observations taken from the Anbar campaign
that relate to the future irregular conflict environment and to the
efficacy of counterinsurgency, engagement, and counterterrorism as
instruments for managing these future challenges.

Table 1: Lessons from Anbar
The case of Anbar illustrates population-centric warfare, and it should
foster insitutional changes in how Marines and other armed servies
approach these operations.

1. There is no one-size-fits-all plan to respond to population-centric
warfare. All plans have to be contextualized for the specific
environment.
2. Contextualizing requires a deep cultural understanding of the local
population—how they perceive and think about their world, how they
organize social and political relations.
3. Armed groups are complex and diverse. New frameworks need to be
conceptualized that can provide detailed knowledge about their
organizational and operational capabilities.
4. There is no “COIN in a box.” COIN principles mst be customized for
the context in which irregular warfare takes place.
5. Counterterrorism operations will continue to serve as an important
complement to counterinsurgency operations.
6. Future counterinsurgency success will require military and political
advisors who can take a hands-on approach. Their effective mediation
will help shape the orientation and conduct of diverse local leaders and
communities.
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7. Holding territory in irregular conflicts once it is cleared requires
indigenous police forces, and this must be facilitated by engagement.
8. Successful COIN campaigns require effective methods for amassing
and disseminating timely and accurate local intelligence.
9. The transition from kinetic operations to post-conflict governance,
reconstruction, and rule of law is a critical period. Post-conflict
operations must be taken over by the appropriate civilian agencies, not
continued by the military services.
10. The unexpected will always be present in the fight, and the
unforseen will always be a challenge. COIN planners and commanders
must expect surprises and be able to adapt quickly when unprepared-for
events occur.

First, Anbar is an illustration of population-centric warfare, and
it should foster institutional changes in how Marines and the other
armed services approach these operations. New concepts and
capabilities are needed to manage these irregular fights, as the Anbar
campaign displayed. Moreover, there is no one-size-fits-all in
responding to population-centric warfare. The operational concepts for
succeeding in Anbar were anchored in counterinsurgency doctrine. But
the COIN plan had to be contextualized for that environment.
Second, to be able to contextualize necessitates deep cultural
understanding of the local population, how the people perceive and
think about their world, and the ways in which they organize social and
political relations to survive in it. Without this understanding, it will be
impossible to successfully prosecute future population-centric conflicts.
In Anbar, this took time to attain. To succeed, the Marines had to be
able to engage the Sunni tribes and their leaders on their own terms,
which called for a sound grasp of Bedouin and Arabic tribal traditions,
Islamic principles, and Arab cultural values. This knowledge came to
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serve as the foundation upon which to build a tribal engagement
strategy. I MEF in 2006 and II MEF the following year embedded that
knowledge in their shared campaign plan.
Third, armed groups are complex and diverse actors not easily
discerned or figured out. To know this kind of enemy, who will surely
be present in future irregular conflicts, Marines and soldiers will
require new methods for profiling the organizational and operational
capabilities of these diverse non-state actors. New frameworks need to
be conceptualized to provide commanders with detailed knowledge that
encompasses the key characteristics of armed groups. By gaining
understanding of these characteristics, comprehensive depictions can be
generated and assembled. In Anbar, armed groups comprising the
insurgency consisted of several clandestine organizations. And the most
sophisticated of them—AQI—maintained a secret infrastructure with
sub-units that included intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities,
as well as fighting, financial, logistical, and communications units.
Fourth, COIN will have a place in future irregular conflicts
where the objective is to influence and secure the population. Adopting
a counterinsurgency strategy based on the standard COIN tenets of
clear-hold-build-transfer and spreading that oil spot was very effective
in Anbar. But how COIN is applied in the future cannot follow a
cookie-cutter approach. There is no “COIN in a box,” no blueprint to
take off the shelf and implement. COIN principles must be customized
for the context in which irregular war takes place. Those old
counterinsurgency classics and FM 3-24 can take you only so far; they
provide a framework but not a blueprint. Future counterinsurgency
operations will have to be tailored to the fight.
Fifth, while the new counterinsurgency literature devotes
considerable attention to non-kinetic lines of operations with an
emphasis on civil agencies carrying out humanitarian and
developmental activities, COIN in Anbar was still war, and it still
involved combat. Success in Anbar began with Marine and Army units
sweeping the insurgents from the cities and towns spread along the
Euphrates from Fallujah to the Syrian border. They used firepower and
maneuvers to attack enemy strongholds, drive the insurgents out, and
hold that ground after it was cleared. And they were not the only forces
92

Shultz: Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps
carrying out combat operations in Anbar; special mission units
comprised of JSOC operators were also on the ground. While the
MEF’s force isolated the population from AQI, it did not eliminate its
clandestine or secret underground. But JSOC units did by directly
targeting the personnel that populated AQI’s clandestine apparatus. In
the future, counterterrorism operations will continue to serve as an
important complement to counterinsurgency campaigns.
Sixth, to execute successful counterinsurgency programs in
future conflict environments, the U.S. will need military and political
advisors who can take a hands-on approach and, through effective
mediation, help shape the orientation and conduct of diverse local
leaders and communities. Such advisors must be able to foster
constructive interaction and cooperation in conflict and post-conflict
settings where power is characteristically personalized and
factionalized. An examination of successful counterinsurgency efforts
in the past demonstrates that individuals with these skills have often
played key roles. And this narrative illustrates how the Marines and
their Army counterparts in Anbar began to develop this advisory
capability, not by design but through on-the-job learning. And when it
became apparent how important it was to managing the conflict, II
MEF initiated a training effort to instill advisory skills in officers and
NCOs down to the company and platoon levels.
Seven, holding territory in irregular conflicts once it is cleared
requires indigenous police forces. All the COIN classics stress that
indigenous police are a key counterinsurgency capability. This again
proved to be the case in Anbar. The key to holding territory was the
expansion of Iraqi security forces, especially the police, for they
provided a persistent presence within the local population. Al Qaeda
also understood the importance of indigenous police and the dangers
they posed to its hold on the province. If the ranks of the police came to
be filled with local tribesmen, they would no longer be able to hide in
plain sight and would soon be out of business. But increasing the size
of the police as a part of COIN strategy cannot take place in a vacuum.
It has to be facilitated by engagement, as can be seen in the Anbar
experience.
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Eight, successful COIN campaigns require effective methods
for amassing and disseminating timely and accurate local intelligence.
That COIN is an intelligence-led fight is one of those other maxims
found in both classic and current counterinsurgency doctrine. Closely
connected to this intelligence requirement are two other COIN
prerequisites discussed above: a physical presence capable of holding
territory and a strong indigenous police force. In Anbar, these three
COIN requirements were symbiotically connected. Clearing and
holding of territory fostered the expansion of police forces, which made
possible collection of the local intelligence needed to expose AQI’s
underground organization. No longer could AQI members hide among
the population. To further exploit this opportunity, II MEF in 2007
fostered the formation of special police intelligence units that enhanced
the capacity of the Anbar police to roll up AQI.
Nine, the transition from kinetic operations to post-conflict
governance, reconstruction, and rule of law is a critical juncture in all
counterinsurgency campaigns. Once it begins, managing COIN’s build
period requires a broader array of capabilities than those employed in
the clear-and-hold phases. II MEF was ready for that changeover in
2007. It had organized to jumpstart the processes of governance,
economic development, and rule of law. And it did so effectively, but
within limitations. II MEF’s role was a restricted one: it was able to get
the “build” process started, but the completion of that process was
beyond its responsibility and capabilities. An important lesson from the
Anbar campaign is that post-conflict operations, whether they are a part
of counterinsurgency missions or of other contingencies, are not the
primary responsibility of the military services. While the U.S. military
can help initiate this phase, once it is underway the civilian agencies
have to develop the means to take control of it and bring it to
completion.
Ten, in counterinsurgency warfare, as with its conventional
counterpart, the only constant is that the unexpected will always be
present in the fight. The unforeseen will challenge COIN campaign
plans. To deal effectively with the unexpected future, COIN planners
and commanders must be schooled to expect surprise and be
predisposed to adapt when unprepared-for events occur. During the
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spring of 2007, the unexpected happened in Anbar, and it happened
fast. The fight abruptly changed. When II MEF returned to the province
in the beginning of that year, it anticipated no sharp drop-off in
insurgent violence any time soon. The conflict had settled into a
bloody, protracted struggle and, according to the COIN classics, it
would take considerable time to root the insurgents out. But a sea
change happened. Within 100 days of arriving, II MEF saw the
situation virtually turned on its head as insurgent violence dropped
precipitously. The crossover point from the kinetic fight to the postconflict phase of COIN was not by the book. However, to the credit of
II MEF, its planners had prepared to exploit that turn of events. And
they did. The result, as Gen. Kelly noted above, was that by the end of
2008 it was “appropriate to use the term victory in Anbar.”

Discussion Questions
1. Has doctrine changed in the face of this experience? How can
we ensure that these lessons will not be lost?
2. Is the entire organization learning these lessons, or select
individuals within the organization? How can individual
learning be transmitted to the organization as a whole?
3. Would these results have been possible with forces other than
the Marines? How can other branches of the military learn
from the Marines? Do they need to?
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